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PREFACE
The basic reason for making this study is to reach

an understanding and explanation of the phenomena that

occurred in relation to the Cyprus dispute in 19G4.

As far

as the impact is concerned, the failure to obtain the poli-

tical support of the United States, Turkey's main ally, and
of a majority of the states in the United Nations marks a

turning point in Turkish foreign policy.

establish the interdependence of these

tv/o

The study seeks to

events by arguing

that in basing its entire foreign policy on an exclusive and

excessively close political, military, and economic relationship with the United States, the Turkish government

v;as

singularly ill-prepared for any contingency that might involve a conflict of Turkish and American interests.

The

alienation she faced in the United Nations is explained in
terms of the outspoken role Turkey had assumed in pursuing
pro-V7est and pro-American policies in its relations with

the neutrals and the newly independent countries which later

formed the Third V7orld group in the United Nations.
Cyprus
The study focuses on the changes affected by the

crisis in Turkish foreign policy.

In order to do so,

it covers

several definite
the post-World War Two years during which
contrasted with
patterns were established. These, then, are

conflict between
the modifications adopted after the Cyprus
1964 and 1970.

It
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the post-'Vorld

shaped most by her alliance with the West.

".Var

Two years has been

Focusing on the sixties,

the study firbt traces the established patterns in forcifi;n policy;

second,

it pieces major eriphasis on the rarai fications of the Cyprus

conflict of 1964 for Turkey; and third, it covers the

modifications of policy adopted as

between 1964 and 1970,
is carried both at the

la each of

u

chan;^;es

and

result of this conflict

t)ie

three phases, the analysis

level of general policy, and at the level

of its reflection in the United Nations.

placed
Until the Cyprus crisis, Turkey had pursued a policy which had
and NATO.
a prcmiura on htr ties with the United States

Apart from

of this nultisidcd
the fact that the nature, extent and specifics

specifically detcrcooperation were never critically evaluated or

ventures that were
ained, it also encoura^^ed Turkey to enbark upon
cases were hurrsful as far as
not required by her needs, end iu soae
Assuain^/ an overly anti-Soviet
the state's interests were concerned.
states to aaintrd*
attitude, and belittlin- the cfiorts of soae
a

ueutral

forei,^ft

policy

.verc

na jor exar.iples.

crisis
The sir;aificanco of the Cyprus

wa.s

that it confronted Turkey

not only with a crisis in forciirn relations, hwt also vith the

realization that her interests diifercd frow those of the United
States, and that within the United Nations she was backed only

by a handful of states.

This failure to obtain the political

support of h6r auin ally, and of a aajority of states in the

United Nations
Tlie

;;iarlc3

a turning point ia Turkish foreign policy,

study seeks to establish the interdependence of these

events by arguing that ia

basinj:^

tv/o

its entire foreic!;n policy ©n

an exclusive and excessively close political, military, and economic

relationship with the United States, the Turkisli govern:uent was

singularly ill— prepared for any contingency that aigUt involve
a conflict of Turkish and Anerican interests.
she

The alienation

faced in the United Nations is e>tpLiiwcd in terus of the

outspoken role Turkey had a&sucsed in pursuing pro-'vcst and proAisaerican ;)olicies

in her relations with the ne trals and

tlie

newly independent cor.ntrios whi ch later formed the Thirid World
,

group in the United Nations.
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INTRODUCTION

A brief sketch of the foreign policies of the Republic from its inception in 1923 until 1960 will contribute to

our understanding of the Turkish participation in the United

Nations from 1960 to 1970.

It will be argued that the

foreign policy of the nation evolved through two phases

guided by two principles of policy during the first four
decades of its existence.

From 1923 until roughly the end

of the Second World War, policy makers adhered to the prin-

ciple of neutrality.

As will be remembered, the Ottoman

Empire had participated in the first TJorld
of the Germans

,

V7ar

on the side

and was dismembered up to its inner core

Anatolia, by the occupation forces of the victorious states.
The next four years saw the formation of a national struggle

movement which decided not to fight for the outlying appendages of the Empire, declaring instead Asia Minor as the

homeland of the Turks.

In the ensuing war, the military

presence of the Greeks, the British, the French, and the
Italians were terminated.

Thus, when the Republic was pro-

claimed in 1923, it was in the face of VJestern animosity.
Consequently, for the next two decades the leadership of

Mustafa Kemal worked hard to maintain

Republic among the other nations.

a place for the

new

Their decisions in regard

to Turkey were closely linked with the existence of the state

2

as well as the survival of its people.

In other words, the

independent existence of the Turks and their state
was the
fundamental goal.
In contrast to the shaky ties with the Western
world,

the Republic enjoyed the early material and
spiritual

support of its neighbor, the Soviets.

In fact, a treaty of

friendship was signed in 1921 which enabled the Turks to
concentrate on their altercations with the West.

This

included the signing of the Briand-Kellogg Pact as a party
on an equal footing with other signatories, the eventual

entry to the League of Nations once the country realized that
this organization would no longer be used as a tool of

imperialist expansion directed against itself, and use the

mechanisms of the League as well as other diplomatic negotiations to settle mutual problems with Great Britain,
France, and Greece.

At the same time, Turkey emerged as

the champion of regional agreements aimed at preserving the

status quo, and became the leader in the creation of the

Balkan Entente.

The fruits of such endeavors v/ere reached

eventually in the form of an alliance with Great Britain and
France in 1939 although Turkey was to stay out of the ensuing
war
If the sovereign existence of the Republic was the

primary goal determining the policies formulated by the
statesmen, an equally demanding aspiration was the vision of
a modern, developed Turkey that has ''caught up v/ith the civi-

3

lization level of Europe."

Attempts at reform had a history

of two centuries in the Ottoman Empire, but
they were com-

parable to those of Mustafa Kemal neither in scope nor
in
nature.

Ever since the Republic, there has always been

wide-ranging agreement on

tlie

need for reforms which are

linked to progress, but the disagreement arose on the rate
and extent of change to be introduced.

VThat is

significant,

however, is the strength of the desire to be on par with the

countries of Europe, and to be treated as such by the latter.
In contrast to the intial policy of neutrality, the

period from the end of the second world war up to the present
has been guided by the principle of alignment.

The decision

to strengthen the ties with the West was based on Moscow's

change of heart in regard to Turkey.
and September

Betv/een March 194 5

1946, the Soviet Union denounced a previous

treaty of nonaggression, and, suggesting a change in the

Montreux Convention, asked for the control of the straits
as V7ell as some land along the Eastern frontier of Turkey.

Soon after, the isolation of Turkey was painfully underlined
by the uninformed manner in which Truman approached the

question of the straits in Potsdam in July 1945.

Turkish

diplom.acy went to v/ork immediately, and within a year the

policies of Great Britain and the United States were coor-

dinated with those of Turkey.

Soviet pressure eased off in

the fall of 1946, and the situation was regarded as stable.
VThile Turkey v/as trying to acquire increased military aid

4

from the United States around this tine, it certainly
could
not have foreseen the latter 's decision to provide
urgent
aid along with that given to Greece.

Greece was, however,

in a critical situation, and probably the inclusion
of Turkey

in the Truman Doctrine "was assured primarily because of

association with concern over Greece.
In the cold war atmosphere of the post war era, the

Truman Doctrine officially signaled that Turkey was considered
to belong to the VJestern pole.

Relations with the West and

especially v/ith the United States grew dramatically, and
achieved not only a dominant but exclusive character V7ithin
Turkish foreign policy over the next two decades.

Since the

Turks wanted to be the beneficiaries of the United States

military strength while sitting at the doorsteps of the
.

Soviets, to be included in the North Atlantic Treaty Organ-

ization (NATO)

V7as

regarded with utmost urgency.

However,

the VJest shov7ed initial reluctance and resistance to extend

membership to this unindustrialized Mediterranean country
burdened by non-European land and sea borders with the Soviets,
a Moslem population, and an unclear status possessing

neither a fully Eastern nor

a fully ^7estern character.

In

overcoming this unreceptive attitude the displomatic efforts
of Ankara were much aided by the eruption of the Korean war

^George Harris, Troubled Allia nce ^__Turkj^sji^Ai^
I
Problems in Historic al PorspectivG 1^45-19 71, AE -Hoover
Policy Studies (v;ashinqton D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972), p. 26.
,
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which enabled the Turks to show the fighting
caliber of
their army to their Western friends.
In

the final analysis,

the advantages to be accrued by the Turkish
mein})ership

namely, opening another front the Soviets have
to contend
with, using an outlying strategic base, and
bolstering the

lagging European defense with a huge, soldier-intensive
army must have outweighed other considerations, for in
1952

Turkey became a full member of this regional defense organization.
In fact, this membership contained the seeds of yet

another regional organization, the Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO)

,

for Great Britain had acceded to include Turkey in

NATO only on the condition that the latter agree to defend
the former's oil interests in the Near East.

That the govern-

ment carried out this task over-enthusiastically in the
following years is in fact a manifestation of the less than

prudent foreign policies pursued by the Menderes governments
between 1950 and 1960.

Even the relations with the United

States, which after the second World War constituted the

basic pillar of Turkish foreign policy, were conducted on a
level of untenableness which proved to be damaging to the

relationship itself, compromising the best interests of the
nation, and provocative in the eyes of the Soviets.

It

would be legitimate to assume that, along with the political
oppression at home, the bankrupt economic policies at home
and abroad, the unenlightened foreign policy of Menderes

6

played a crucial role in the development of
events leading
to the first dramatic upheaval in the
domestic affairs of
the Republic, the revolution of May
27, 1D60.
Turkish Participation in the United N ations
In order to become a charter meml^er of this
organiza-

tion, Turkey had declared war on Germany shortly before

the defeat of the latter.

Although Turkey joined other

nations in expressing genuine hope that the United Nations

would be an important contribution to the maintenance of
world peace and order, she deemed it necessary to by-pass
the organization two years later v/hen the United States aid

to strengthen the security forces was accepted under the

Truman Doctrine.

".

.

.

in so far as Turkey unilaterally

decided that the Soviet claim constituted a threat to the
peace and appealed directly to the United States for military

help in order to protect its security, this action was

incompatible with the spirit and the collective security

provisions of the Charter.

Under Article 39 of the Charter,

the right to decide that a threat to the peace exists is

given to the Security Council." 2
In general, hov;ever, Turkey has been interested in

strengthening the United Nations, preferring to settle disputes in accordance with international law and the provisions
^Mehm.et Gonlubol, Turkish Participation in the Unijfced
Natio ns 1945-1954 (Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Basimevi,
19l;T)~; p. 163.
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of the Charter.

Professor Gonlubol has studied the Turkish

reaction to the more important matters brought to the
United
Nations through 1954. He concludes that Turkey had block-

voted in every important "East-West" issue, and more frequently than not had aligned herself

v/ith the

developed

colonial states at the expense of numerous underdeveloped

and anticolonial Asian, Arab, and African ones.^

from a nation which had

v/on

Coming

its independence from the hands

of the same West, this record was indeed disheartening, and

would take an exacting toll later at a conjuncture of events
critical for Turkey.
Primarily, this dissertation will focus upon the

Turkish foreign policy and its reflection in the United
Nations during the course of the decade 1960-1970.

Obser-

vers of Turkish foreign policy agree that the eruption of
the Cyprus conflict constitutes the most important develop-

ment during this period.

To date, there has been no in-

depth examination of this crisis partly because matters

relating to the issue are still considered highly sensitive
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Thus, access to official

documents and communications is effectively hindered.

Another reason is that although peace has returned to the
island, the matter is regarded as unsettled since the talks

between the communal leaders of the Greek and the Turkish peo
^

Ibid., p. 160.

8

pies have been continuing for years
without reaching a final
agreement. Consequently, it is necessary to
emphasize that
in this study only a minimum attention
will be paid to the
whys and hows of this regional crisis. Rather,
the emphasis
will be on the repercussions of the conflict.
First,
the

significance of the Inonu-Johnson letters will deserve
some

deliberations in so far as this exchange marks the turning

point in the Turkish-American relations.

Second, an attempt

will be made to place within perspective the painful isolation that faced the Turks when the Cyprus issue was brought
to the United Nations.

Briefly, it will be argued that

bloc-voting, a reflection of the heavily American

oriented and inflexible Turkish foreign policy,
to the best interests of the nation.

It

v;as

v/as

contrary

the Cyprus crisis

which forced the reality into the awareness of the generally
unsuspecting leaders.

I'Thether this in

turn led to policy

revisions observable in the Turkish vote in the United Nations
is an open question that will be eagerly pursued.

The Cyprus conflict occurred around mid-sixties.

It

is hoped that analyzing the Turkish foreign policy in the

years before (1960-64) and after (1964-1970) the crisis will

highlight any trends as well as changes.

At the same time,

the 1960 revolution, the related Khrushchev-Gursel communi-

cations, and the Cuban missile crisis of the early sixties
v;ill

also be mentioned.

9

Method and Concept
The basic model to be employed in
this study will be
a variant of the so-called Rational
Actor model. The classic

model assumes first, that

"v/hat

must be explained is an

action, i.e., behavior that reflects purpose
or intuition;
second, that the actor is a national government;
third, that
the action is chosen as a calculated solution
to a problem. "4
Two theoretical modifications will be introduced.
First,

abstaining from action, i.e., the decision not to act, and
second, explaining national behavior as departures from
the

rationality norm will be given equal consideration.
The concept of national interest will be the linchpin
of this study.

For students of politics the concept is

crucial yet difficult to work with.

Here, the conviction

is that to formulate a universal definition of "national

interest" that could be fruitfully operationalized in v/idely

varying circumstances for different states would be useless
even if it were possible.

Consequently, concentration will

be on the goals and the aspirations identified as those of

the country by its leaders:

existence of the Republic,
modernization.

a)

b)

perpetuating the independent

peaceful development toward

With these main tenets "national interest"

^ Graham Allison.
Expla ining
E ssence of Decision:
Little Brovm & Co,
the Cuban i issile Crisis TBostorTI
iDTi)
p. it:
r

,

,
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will be treated essentially as a norm.

The performance of

the government will then be explained and evaluated
as approx-

imations to choices expected by the tenets of the concept.

PART

I.

BACKGROUND

CHAPTER

I

DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS
Political De m ocracy:

1945-1960

From Single to Multi-Part y

From the inception of the Turkish Republic in 1923
until the end of the second World War, the People's Republican Party established by Ataturk and later led by Inonu,
the former comrade-in-arms of Ataturk,

v/as

the only formal

political organization outside the Grand National Assembly.
The regime was authoritarian, intolerant of opposition, but

remarkably free of repression or surveillance, the hall-

marks of dictatorial rule.

The unity among the political

elite enabled the government to enact drastic reforms

guided by the principles of nationalism, secularism, and
modernism.

This relentless drive for change must have

frustrated the traditionalist, fatalistic, and quite religious peasants.

The masses were at the receiving end how-

ever, and the rigid one-party system did not provide them

with opportunities to express their viewpoints.
Inonu, at the end of the

Vlar,

announced the decision

to liberalize the regime, and indicated the need for an

opposition party.
pretations.

This decision has received varying inter-

Three cynical views hold that it was due,

first, to a miscalculation on the part of the party of its

own strength; second, to a desire to please the West at

a

13

tiine

when Turkey found itself isolated and exposed;
third,

to direct American intervention.

There might be a touch of

truth to each of these explanations.

Certainly the prestige

of the United States was at its peak after victory in
the

world war, and foreign developments must have influenced
the decisions of the ruling party while encouraging the

opposition.

Bernard Lewis rejects the thesis that liberali-

zation was exclusively "a piece of v/indow-dressing designed
to please and flatter Turkey's VJestern allies",^ and

contends that a new generation v;hich had matured under the
intense Westernization of the Kemalist regime naturally

inclined tov/ard application at home of the liberal traditions of the West.

Similarly, Dogan Avcioglu, while taking

note of the foreign pressures, thinks that the truth would
be reflected more fully if the main reasons for the relaxation of authoritarianism v/ere to be found within the domestic

conditions.

He maintains that the seeds of the democratic

tradition were contained in the progressive principles of
Kemalism, and that in 1945 the right moment to actualize this

potential had been reached.

He also underlines the wide-

ranging complaints among the populace due to the difficulties

brought by the War, and the harsh attitude of the bureaucracy
^Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey
Royal Institute of International Affairs (London: Oxford
University Press, 1961), pp. 313-314.
,
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during the Inonu years.

Whatever the combination of factors affecting
the
decision of the leaders of the Republican Party

to liberalize

the regime, a small group within the party
flanks seized

on the opportunity to form the Democratic Party
in 1946.
Tv^o

of the leaders of the new party were Celal Bayar

and Adnan Henderes.

Bayar had served the leaderships of

Ataturk and Inonu, and by 1946 had come to represent
commercial interests of the new middle class.

tlie

Henderes,

on the other hand, was a lawyer better knovm as a major

landowner in the Aegean area.

The Democratic Party

campaigned on a platform of unrestricted civil liberties,
laissez-faire economics, relaxed secularism, and a better

standard of living for the impoverished peasants.

The

appeal of the party was enormous probably because it pro-

vided an alternative to the
Party rule, and
formance.

v/as

tv7o

decades of the Republican

not burdened by a record of past per-

In four years, the party expanded its organiza-

tion from the cities to tov/ns and villages, and won an

astounding victory in the 1950 elections.

With 89.3 per

cent of the eligible voters participating, 396 out of 487
seats in the Assembly went to the Democrats, and 68 to the

Republicans

key]

7

^Dogan Avcioglu, Turkiye'nin Duzeni [The Order in Tur(Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1968), p. 249.

Turkey's Politics: The Trans_ijtic^n^o_ a_
Multi- Party System (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
"^Kemal Karpat,

r9'59)7 p.

241^.

15

The significance of this election is not so much that it

took place at all, or that it was completely free and orderly,
or that the Democratic Party was voted in by a landslide.

Rather, its uniqueness lies in the fact that the Republican

People's Party accepted the results calmly, and Inonu

assumed the leadership of the opposition.

Nothing could have

been further removed from the political traditions of the
country, and it is said, this lesson in democracy impressed
the people very deeply.

The next

fev7

years

sav7 a

normal relationship betv/een

the Democrats and the Republicans.

"honeymoon" period

v^as

shortlived.

Unfortunately, the

Although the Democrats

were returned to pov/er in the elections of 1954 and 1957

,

they

became increasingly hostile toward criticism and corrupt in

management of state affairs.
Political Oppression:
Kemal Karpat things
to come to office

v/as

Corruption of the Rulin g Party
tliat

enabling the Democratic Party

"a great mistake in a country in

barely
which the principles of democracy had been only
government's
touched upon and the checks and balances of

powers had not been properly regulated."^

^^hile the first

it is comr^only
part of this assertion is open to debate,

force until 19G0,
accepted that the 1924 constitution, in
Deeply
regime.
ill-fitted the features of a m.ulti-party
national will is
committed to the Rousseauian theory that

8lbid., p. 181.
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represented only by the legislature, the 1924
Constitution
granted extensive powers to the National AssenLbly
without
providing for the necessary checks. Furthermore,
it

continued the unicameral legislative system, without
the

moderating influences of an upper house.

With no institu-

tional restraints, the majority party and the government

exploited the system blatantly for their o\m partisan

purposes at the expense of the basic rights of the opposition and the citizens.^
In fact, from 1954 to 1960 the defining characteristics

of the political scene was the accelerating polarization
betv/een the Democrats and the Republicans.

One of the

three main issues of contention was the role of reliqion
in Turkish life.^^

By 1949, the Republican Party had come

to allow religious instruction in schools, and a Faculty of

Divinity was established for the purpose of providing educated
religious leaders.

Quantitatively, the Democrats did more

on these accounts and qualitatively, they permitted the

new developments to take on a conservative coloring.

Less

formally, religious publications and suppressed mystic sects

began to reappear along with more public celebrations of the
9

Suna Kili, Assem}:)ly Debates on the Constitutions
Robert College Research Center,
of 1 924 and 1961 (Istanbul:
1971)

,

pp.

6-8.

^^Walter Weiker, The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961
Brookings Institution, 1963) pp. 8-11.
(Washington, D.C.:
,
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religious holidays.

Profoundly symbolic of the clash

between the reformist-secular and the
conservative-religious

mentalities was the return to the Arabic in the
call to
prayer instead of the Turkish translation as
stipulated
by a 1932 law.
The second issue contributing to the polarization
of politics can be summed up as that of political
freedom.

After 1953 the Democratic Party embarked on the road of
enacting laws and regulations with the purpose of restricting the independence and the power of such groups and

institutions as the press, the universities, the opposition
parties, civil servants, and the Assembly itself.

Press

Lav7s

Tv;o

punished "the spreading of false news; insulting

or invading the privacy of public officials; damaging public

confidence in or the prestige of the government."

Professors

were banned from political activity, while the government
resorted to the mechanisms of suspension and non-promotion

within the universities.
Republican Party

v/ere

In 1953, most of the assets of the

confiscated, and in 1956, party meet-

ings were permitted only for a limited duration before elections.

Civil servants learned that they could be dismissed

without having the right of appeal.
1957 elections, a new

lav;

In preparing for the

prohibited coalitions, and stipur

lated that any party winning the "most" votes in a province

would receive the entire number of deputies of that province.
The same year, the questioning of ministers by deputies was

18

limited in a series of restrictions on
the Assembly itself.
Finally, the official results of the elections
were never
published, feeding the charges that they were
rigged.
It was inevitable that such a repressive
regime

would bring disaster upon itself.

Although the military

intervention was touched off by a further series of
critical
developments, there was a third major issue which
contributed
not only to the polarization between the Democrats and
the

Republicans, but also to the rapidly worsening prospects of
the country.

The Economy:

From Etatism to Laissez-Faire to Bankrup t cy

For centuries, the capitulations, the system which

held the V7estern citizens immune from Ottoman jurisdiction
and permitted them to live under the jurisdiction of their

own consuls

,

had led to the economic exploitation of the

Ottoman economy, obstructing the latter 's resurgence, and

restricting the state's rights of sovereignty over its land.
Ever since the foresighted Lausanne treaty which met the
demands of Ataturk for complete political, juridical, and
financial independence, the successive governments of the

Republic have been extremely cautious in their economic
relations with foreign states.

This closed policy of the

Republican Party governments toward outside capital was
supplemented by the adoption of etatism at home.

Not only

did Turkey lack a class of entrepreneurs to bring about the

19

necessary developments, but political leaders
also doubted
the willingness of the private sector to finance
costly
long-term investments,
J^eutral during the viar
vrith all

,

Turkey

cairte

out of the crisis

foreign debts paid, and with a considerable stock

Of gold and foreign currency

. "'•^

It was at this point that

the Soviets started to pressure their southern neighbor,
a major and counterproductive blunder in terms of their
(designs on Turkey.

This led to the Turkish-American

alliance which was promptly reflected in the economic policy
of the nation.

"There is no doubt," writes Bernard Lewis,

"that American pressure was exerted rather strongly in favour
of private enterprise and against etatism, and the moves of
the People's Party government in this direction were no

doubt due in large measure to the terms of American loans
and the advice of American advisers."

under the riarshall plan (1948-1951)

The aid received

v/as

prescribed for the

development of agriculture so that Turkey could supply

a

war-

torn Europe with food and raw materials in return for which
she could buy the industrial products of the Western states.

This clear break from the principle of Ataturk that

political independence required a self-sufficient industrial
base was accelerated by the Menderes governments which were
^^Avcioglu, Turkiye'nin Duzeni

,

p.

276.

^^Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 315.
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fe^i.?^ted to the promotion of foreign and private
investfaents.

Between 1950 and 1953 agricultural credits
for

peasants and inf rastructural projects like road
building
enabled the country to take a sigh of relief. However,
as

the government had an aversion to the concept of
planned
it inevitably overextended its activities in

relation to its resources.

The gaps between revenues and

expenditures were filled simply by printing more money,

while the resulting acute inflation and insolvency were
^ased periodically by receiving massive doses of foreign
ai^, (^specially from the United States.

Deficit financing finally brought the economy to a

^mplete standstill in 1958.
Ipail

The V7estern allies agreed to

Menderes out through an International Monetary Fund

loan of $359 million.

In v;hat was called a Stabilization

Program the prime minister agreed to devalue the Turkish lira,
impose a set of restrictions on, and strive toward coordinatxon of investment.

^tempts to attain

Shortly afterwards, even half-hearted
a sensible financial balance were aban-

doned as Ilenderes slipped back to his habit of cutting
ribbons at showy and unnecessary projects across

tlie

country.

Financial chaos accompanied by political repression
and religious polarization

v;ere

enough to force the hand of

the army v/hose devotion to the principles of Ataturk con-

tributes to its well-developed sense of responsibility for
the v/elfare of the Republic.

The discontent led to actual
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interference in a final sequence of events in
the final
months before May, 1960.
Tv7enty days after the May 1960 revolution,

to be

discussed belov;, it was revealed that the internal
and
external debts facing the country amounted to a
grand
total of $1,354,604,636.^^

The unprecedented scale of

this bankruptcy prompted the revolutionary leadership
of

National Unity Committee to launch

a

program of deflationary

austerity measures which succeeded in a year to balance
the budget and to restore price stability and the confidence

of foreign creditors in extending aid.

Perhaps the most

important economic achievement of the military leadership
v/as

the establishment of the State Planning Organization.

The '60 Revolution:

Return to the Rule of

Lav7

Amid rumors that the government vrould call new elections a year ahead of time, the Democrats passed a law in

April 1960 establishing "the Committee to Investigate the

Activities of the Republican Party and a section of the
Press."

The Committee was formally granted

v/ide pov/ers

ranging from a ban on political activities supported by
penalties to the suspension of civil service, penal, and
judicial laws.

The law and the expulsion of the protesting

Inonu from the Assembly led to immediate student riots

in

the Istanbul and Ankara Universities countered by policEand
13

Weiker, Turkish Revolution, p. 12.

soldiers instructed to fire.

Martial law was declared and

most newspapers and magazines suspended,
while universities
were closed and students sent off to detention
camps.
The

final v/arning came from one thousand cadets
of the Military
College and their officers when they marched
across

Ankara singing military marches.

Six days later, on May 21

the Menderes era was terminated by a military overthrow.

The revolution was completed in four hours with no

bloodshed.

The National Unity Committee, composed entirely

of revolutionary officers, ruled the country for; the next

seventeen months.

Hov/ever,

immediately after the takeover,

the military asked for the help of the university professors

who

v/ere

asked not only to serve in various positions in the

operations of the government, but also

v/ere

exclusively

responsible in formulating the new constitution.
The 1961 constitution provided for liberal provisions

on fundamental rights, and incorporated the idea of a welfare state.

Furthermore, it introduced new legal-political

institutions such as the upper house (Senate of the Republic)

,

the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Council of the Judiciary, and the State Planning Organization.

was the adoption of a

nev7

tional representation.

electoral system based on propor-

The varying drafting committees

worked within a Constituent Assembly.
parties

v;ere allov/ed to

Another major chang*

organize.

constitution was approved in

a

In January 1961, new

Six months later, the new

national referendum v/hich was
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followed by the election of October 1961, and
the return
to civilian rule.

During the seventeen months of the National
Unity
Committee rule, the trial of over 400 leaders of
the

Democratic Party government was one major event.

It lasted

eleven months, watched closely at home and abroad.

"Foreign

legal observers at the trials at various times were unani-

mous in their praise and in their amazement that in the
heavily charged political atmosphere Basol (the head of the
High Council of Justice) was able to keep the trials orderly,

surprisingly fair, and with a minimum of political propaganda

from any quarter."-'-^

IThen the

verdicts were delivered,

there were four death sentences by unanimous vote of the
judges, and eleven by majority vote.

The National Unity

Committee commuted the death sentences of all except three,

approving the difficult decision to send to the gallows
prime minister Menderes, foreign minister Zorlu, and

finance minister Polatkan.
The elections were held a month later, and with 82%
of the eligible voters casting ballots, no one party won

control of the legislature.

In the ensuing four years,

three coalition governments were formed each with different

combinations among the parties:

the Republican Party, the

Justice Party, unofficial heir of the dissolved Democratic
^^Ibid.

,

p.

27.
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rParty, and the smaller new parties also
catering to the

cex-Democratic votes.

In the 1965 and 1969 elections, the

•Justice Party received enough votes to
muster about 53%
cof the 450 seat

Assembly in 1965 and 56% in 1969.

The mutual interaction between domestic and foreign
^policies of any given state is a complex phenomenon.

Domes-

jtic developments are inextricably tied with the
elements
cof

national goals, geopolitical considerations, and uncon-

-.trollable external events, all of which contribute to what
•we call the process of foreign policy formation.

In the case of Turkey between the years of 1945 and

1960, the liberalization of the one-party regime, the
ifree elections of 1950 with results respected by the losing
:side, the thought provoking spectacle of a rigorous new

•party regrettably abusing its pov/er and thus bringing the

ccountry to the brink of disaster in six short years, the

lintervention of the army to protect the welfare of the Re-

public arising from a sense of responsibility, yet necessiitating the abandonment of its traditionally unpolitical role
(if only for a limited period)

,

and the sobering effects of

holding the political leadership of the past decade to account
for its performance, have been significant experiences within
the developing political culture of the Turkish people.

For based on their political consciousness the leaders and
-the

citizens embarked, in a matter of a few years, upon a
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deep-reaching process of evaluation and criticism
of internal
and foreign national policies.
Further, it is in this sane period

fror. 1945 to 1960

that Turkey, seeking political support as

v/ell as

economic

and military aid from the West, was favored especially by
the United States due to world political developments which

placed a premium on Turkey's geographical location.

Under

the Menderes governments Turkish-Zunerican relations assumed

an exclusively privileged character.

In return for total

Turkish acceptance of its policies, the United States
financed Menderes

's

spending, equipped the Turkish army,

and supported the regime.

In short, the T^jnerican policies,

presence, and aid on the one hand, and the Menderes govern-

ments on the other, came to be identified with each other,
at least in the minds of the educated Turks.

Consequently,

when Menderes dragged the country and himself into a sorry
mess, the United States found itself enmeshed in the
lot.

Ilov/ever,

sam.e

anti-?jnericanism did not begin until four

years after the 1960 Revolution.

Just as the latter

enabled the people to criticize Menderes

's

domestic policies,

so the Cyprus crisis of 1964, to be discussed in Chapter IV,

served as the spark which initiated an extensive re-evaluation of "the American element" within Turkish foreign

policy.

CHAPTER II
PATTERNS OF FOREIGN POLICY

1945-1960

Major Policy Developments
The end of the second World War also marks the end
of Turkish neutrality, the guiding principle of
previous

policies.

It is possible to study the events of the next

fifteen years, all developing within the framev/ork of
the Turkish-Western alliance, in three conceptual categories.

Using as our criteria the needs of the state stemming from
the three accepted goals of the Republic:

and territorial integrity;

b)

a)

independence

economic development;

c)

a

modern, "European" status; then compare and contrasting
such needs with those of Turkey's allies in each of the major

developments of the era, we obtain the following grouping:
1)

Policies entirely corresponding to Turkish needs;

2)

Pol-

icies that have not originated from primary Turkish

interests but fulfilling crucial needs of the West;

3)

Poli-

cies detrimental to Turkish interests and encouraged by the
V7est

The Turkish search for and acceptance of Western aid

constitutes the first category of policies advantageous to

both sides.

The Truman aid, formalized by the "Aid to

Turkey Agreement" signed by the United States and Turkey in
1947, the joining of the Council of Europe in 1949, and NATO
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in a952 were policies which all contributed to
the security,
development, and status goals of Turkey.

On the other side,

United States and the V7estern European
countries were
furiously concerned, at the time, about the
progress made
the Communist parties of Eastern and
Central European
.States, followed by the establishment
of the Cominform.
^tl^e

Europe faced a clear imbalance of pov/er around
this time
^hile the situation in Yugoslavia was considered

perilous.

The United States was the first to come to the
conclusion
that the defense of the southern corner of Europe
had to
be fortified.

However, the European mem})ers of the

Atlantic Alliance showed initial reluctance and resistance
^9 pxtend membership to Turkey, a non-industrialized Mediter-

ranean country burdened by non-European land and sea borders

yith the Soviets, a Moslem population, and an unclear status

possessing neither a fully Eastern nor
ter

.

a fully

Western charac-

In overcoming this unreceptive attitude, the diplomatic

efforts of Ankara were aided greatly by the eruption of the
Korean war which enabled the Turks to show their willingness
to fight for a cause also supported by their Western friends.
In the final analysis, the advantages to be accrued by

Turkish membership in NATO, namely, opening another front
the Soviets had to contend with, using an outlying strategic

base which could expose the Caucasian oil and the Ural industry to pressure, and bolstering the lagging European defense

with a huge, soldier-intensive army must have outweighed other
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considerations for in 1952 Turkey became
a full member of
this regional defense organization.

Following the NATO agreement, the military
cooperation
between the United States and Turkey were
complemented
by a series of bilateral agreements.
These controversial
agreements dealt with the different facets of
the

military relationship.

Outstanding issues were the joint

defense radar installations, cooperation between
the Tur-

kish and American Ground, Naval, and Air Forces, certain
airfields with joint defense forces, and the jurisdictional
status of American soldiers, civilians, and organizations.

A few of these

v/ere

ratified by the Turkish Assembly, and

published in the press.

ment of June

1954.,

Thus, the status of Forces Agree-

granting immunities and privileges to

all American government personnel and their dependents (apart

from the diplomatic corps)

,

had received full exposure.

Some others took the form of verbal understandings, not only

filling in the gaps left by formal agreements, but also

enlarging the sphere of American activity by giving permission
to operate the T^erican armed forces postal system, and

authority to open schools for the dependents of American
personnel

1

5

Most crucial, however, were a series of secret agreements, none of which were ratified by the National Assembly.
15

Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 55.

29

It wasn't until the end of the Menderes regime
that

the opposition began to challenge the
constitutionality of

these "executive agreements."

Six years later when the

American response to the Cyprus conflict caused severe
disappointment among Turkish circles prompting a major re-

evaluation of this relationship, the bilateral agreements
became the focus of much critical attention.

Speaking at

a press conference in 1970, prime minister Demirel disclosed

that "over the 25 years of the alliance, 91 bilateral

agreements had been signed and 54 of them had been in
force when the Justice Party had come to power in October
1965."^^

Taken together, they are illuminative of the

errors committed in the name of an alliance between a small
state with specific defense considerations, and a superpower

with much wider interests.
A second group of policies can be described as those
that had not originated from Turkish needs but fulfilled the

expectation of her allies.
into two:

These can regionally be divided

the Balkan and the Middle East policies.

Soon

after acquiring membership in NATO, Turkey and Greece were

encouraged by the United States to form a pact with Yugoslavia in order to stabilize the precarious situation of the
latter.

The ensuing Balkan Defense Pact of 1954 among the

three countries, however, was politically short-lived, al^^Ibid.

,

p.

229.
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though technically it was to be in effect
until 1974.^7
Primarily responsible for this outcome
were the problems,
first, of harmonizing the defense needs
of Yugoslavia
and the NATO commitments of Greece and
Turkey,

and second,

the basic differences of foreign policy
orientations typified by the Turkish preference for exclusive
VJestern ties,

the Greek combination of a more independent
attitude recog-

nizing the status of the neutrals, and the Yugoslav
deter-

mination to stay clear of any East-West contest.

A specific

disagreement was the interpretation of the change in Soviet
foreign policy following Stalin's death.

In any case,

the

1954 Pact was considered lifeless by the end of the decade.

The developments in the Middle East region, on the

other hand, have elicited deeper involvement by Turkey than
those in the Balkans.

Most importantly, Turkish performance

in the Middle East during the 1950

's

has been a significant

contributor towards the country's international image.
Briefly, there have been three major developments:

Baghdad Pact (later called CENTO)
and

c)

;

b)

a)

the

the Suez invasion;

the application of the Eisenhower Doctrine.

The

origins of the Baghdad Pact lie in the Turkish acceptance
to play the lead in creating a post-World War II, proVTestern alliance in the petroleum rich Middle East as a con-

dition to secure British approval of her membership to NATO.
^^Ferenc Vali, Bridae Across the Bosporous: Th e Foreign
Policy of Turkey (Baltimore: Jolins Hopkins Press, 1971) ,p. 200,
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Actually, however, the moving force
behind the pact became
the United States, intent on establishing
a chain of
defense organizations directed against the
Soviet Union.
A mutual defense treaty between Turkey
and Iraq (19 55) served
as the nucleus to which Iran, Pakistan,
and Great Britain
acceeded the same year. The United States, while
participating in the committee work and meetings, preferred
not
to

become a formal member. in order not to further alienate
the
anti-pact states of the region, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and
Israel on the one hand, and not to provoke the Soviet Union
on the other.
It is difficult to understand the military reasoning

behind the Baghdad Pact.

At the time, there were no Soviet

advisors in Syria, Iraq, or Egypt, and no concentration of
Soviet ships in the eastern Mediterranean.

Furthermore, of

the two regional states bordering the Soviets, Turkey was

already covered by NATO, and Iran was pro-West.

The third

regional and the only Arab state, Iraq, hoped that the pact

would bring increased economic possibilities, a position of
additional strength vis-a-vis Israel, as well as a possible

position of leadership in the Arab world.

Pakistan, mean-

while, eyed the pact as a means of getting the upper-hand
18

TVhmot Esmer et al., Olaylarla Turk Pis Politikasi
1919-1965 [Events of Turkish Foreign Policy 1919-1965]
Ankara Universitesi Siyasi Bilgiler Fakultesi Yayinlari,
No. 279, (Ankara:
Sevinc Matbaasi, 1969), p. 274.

32

in its dispute with India over
Kashmir.

In short, there were

no threats of direct Soviet aggression
to necessitate a
defense organization in the Middle East.
Even if there were,
the combined military power of the
regional signatories,

excepting Turkey, was almost negligible.

As far as Turkey

was concerned, she could neither expect
military support
from the pact, nor contribute to it while all
but two of
her divisions were committed to the NATO command.

If there

was no Soviet military threat, there were, however,
vested

economic and political interests in the Middle East.

V7ith

the British and French withdrav;al at the end of the War,
the resulting power vacuum

vjas

hardly compatible with exten-

sive British oil-investments in the area.

On the other

hand, the United States probably aimed at keeping the area

under Western influence, and linking NATO with the Southeast

Asia Treaty Organization by the Baghdad Pact.
It ought not have been surprising that this ill-

conceived cooperation would bring unexpected results.
Turkey and her allies soon realized their failure to read
the strength of the new Arab nationalism.

Egypt bitterly

denounced the pact, and the Turkish role in initiating it.
The Arab world's condemnation of Turkey as the tool of

Western colonialism was echoed in the criticisms from India.
In a different vein, Israel claimed that the pact was also

directed against herself.
relations

v/as

The strain in Israeli-Turkish

further aggravated when Turkey recalled her
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ainbassador in Tel-Aviv in order to appease
the Arabs, but

unsuccessfully.

Internationally, the most significant

outcome was the introduction of the Soviet
presence to the
Middle East. The latter was almost forced to
counter the
V7estern initiatives, and indeed, arms shipments
began to

reach Egypt the same year.

Thus, Turkey had unnecessarily

provoked the neighbor it feared most, besides acquiring
the image of a lackey of Western imperialism.

The second major development in the .Middle East was
the 1956 Israeli attack against Egypt, followed by the

French-British invasion of the canal zone.

Although Turkey

had nothing to do with the crisis directly, it was another
blov/ to both her and the

Baghdad Pact's image.

Turkish

press and politicians as well as the representatives of
Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan (all pact members except

for Great Britain) strongly denounced the aggression,

reiterating their support for the 1947 resolution of the
United Nations concerning Palestine.

It can not be denied,

hov/ever, that the event marked another demerit for Turkish

diplomacy
The situation created by the gaffes of Britain and

France were fully exploited by the Soviets whose prestige
was enhanced considerably in Egypt and Syria.

In order to

counter this, the United States launched in 1957

offensive knovm as the Eisenhower Doctrine.

a

diplomatic

Under this

formulation. Congress authorized the President to send 7aneri-
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can forces, along with economic and
military aid, to
nations requesting such assistance. Prior
to the application of this new policy, hox^ever the
contest between the
two super states grew sharper over the
strained SyrianTurkish relations. Because these neighbors shared
a long
border, Turkey follov^red with apprehension the
progress of
,

the Syrian left.

There was a heated exchange of notes

with Syria which had charged Turkey with massive troop
deployments along the border.

Turkey issued a denial,

the Soviet Union threatened Turkey with retaliation, and

the United States reiterated its defense commitments

to Turkey.

The conflict proved to be short-lived, and Tur-

kish fears subsided when Syria and Egypt formed the United

Arab Republic, an alliance much less threatening than

a

Soviet-Syrian one.
In the same eventful year of 1958, a revolution in

pro-Western Iraq brought down the monarchy.

The next days

American troops landed in Lebanon upon the invitation of

President Chamoun, and two days later Jordan asked and
received similar assistance from the British.

The Baghdad

Pact members officially expressed their pleasure at this

exemplary crushing of "communist" inroads in the Middle East.
Turkey's unconditional endorsement of this joint-venture

was in fact much more involved.

When it was learned that

the United States had utilized the Incirlik air base

(southern Turkey) during the Lebanese intervention, there
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was an outburst of domestic and foreign
criticism directed
at the Menderes government. VThat had
happened was that a
NATO base, set up for the purpose of defending
Turkey

against any Soviet aggression, had been utilized
by the
Americans with Turkish approval, in order to enhance

Ameri-

can interests in a conflict which did not involve
Turkey
in any manner.

As far as tracing criticisms of foreign

policies are concerned, the following remark by the opposition leader is noteworthy:
know:

"...

This is what

v;e

want to

Have the American troops come to Adana [the tovm

where the base is located] on our government's invitation,
or have they applied for the permission of our government? "^^

Such criticisms were, in 1958, mostly directed against
the government rather than the United States.

the opposition

v;as

A year later,

once again irritated by a new bilateral

agreement between the United States and Turkey (the same
agreement was acceded to also by Iran and Pakistan, the
other members of the Baghdad Pact renamed the Central Treaty
Organization, following the v/ithdrawal of Republican Iraq)

The United States obligated itself to assist these countries

with her armed forces in case of an aggression.

Turkey al-

ready having had such guarantee under NATO understandings,

what fostered attention was

a

new phrase in the preamble

noting the determination of the parties to resist "direct or
^^Ibid.

,

p.

326.
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indirect aggression "20
.

m

view of the domestic developments

Pf the last few years (Menderes persecuting
his opposition,
placing restrictions on press and political
activities)
the
opposition thought that Menderes intended to
ask for American
assistance to stifle it.
"Unaccountably, the government
fueled these fears by refusing to define the
offending terra
,

on the grounds that its meaning had been
worked out in

secret negotiations with the United States.

Foreign minister

Zorlu later added that an imprecise definition was
necessary
to cover new forms of aggression— a not v^7holly reassuring

explanation to the opposition. "^l
It was mentioned above that the events of the fifteen

y«ar period between 1945 and 1960 could be studied in three
conceptual categories.

Moving now to the third group of

policies advocated by Turkey, namely those that were detri-

mental to Turkish interests and encouraged by the
sub-sections would define the group:

a)

VJest,

two

Policy toward

the Soviet Union, and b) Policy toward the neutrals.

As far as the post-war Soviet-Turkish relations are
concerned, the 1945-1946 Soviet demands for the control of
the Straits and return of some eastern territories have been
20
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most decisive in shaping the Turkish
policy for the next
fifteen years. Based on historical experience,
it was

natural for Turks to be deeply frightened by
such pressures,
and to seek alliances with the Uest to lessen
the disadvantages of their exposed location.
In doing so,
however, a

major error was coimitted in abandoning moderation,
reflecting in fact, a lack of consideration for the long-term
interests of the state.

Instead of realizing and respecting

the sensitivities the Soviets might have as a result of

their superpower status, Turkish leaders did not hesitate
to embark upon measures v/hich were not only unv/arranted by
the security and economic goals of their country, but also

were clearly provocative in Soviet eyes.

Fortunately for

the Turks, the new leadership after Stalin regretted the

previous mistake of scaring the Turks into a staunchly

anti-Soviet alliance, and beginning in 1953, bent over back-

wards in order to nurse Turkey to a less paranoid perspective
The Soviets were critical of the Truman aid as v;ell
as the NATO and the Tonerican bases in Turkey.

Moscow

pointed out that Turkey had no place in what it considered
an offensive, Atlantic alliance.

Similarly, it denounced the

British idea of a Near East command.

A major reversal of

attitude by the Soviets occurred in 1953.

They issued a

text reviewing Soviet-Turkish relations, and stated in
part:

.

.

the Governments of Armenia and Georgia have

found it possible to renounce their territorial claims on
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Turkey.

Concerning the question of the Straits the
Soviet
Government has reconsidered its former
opinion on this

question and

.

.

.

declares that the Soviet Union has not

any kind of territorial claims on Turkey. "22

shift

v;as

This major

in line with a new phase in Soviet policy
declared

to be dedicated to peaceful coexistence and
economic rather

than military competition.

For Turkish politicians, this

was only a change of tactics, and their response was less
than enthusiastic.

needs of Turkey

v/ere

World peace was indivisible; the security
identical with, and could not be

separated from those of NATO.
The Soviets continued their peace offensive by toplevel speeches, through the radio, press coverages, and in

notes to TVnkara during the next seven years.

In 1956,

the press stated the NATO could not form an obstacle to the

rapprochement

between the two countries, and asked for

improvement of economic relations.

Both of these were new and

important elements along the impetus for detente.

Relations

were strained once again during the 1956-1958 Middle East
developments, but Moscow was quick to ease its pressure.
Moreover, the Russian reactions to reconaissance balloons
from, and Jupiter missiles in Turkey were rather soft.
22

Vali, Bridge Across the Bosporus

,

p.

Tur-

174.

2^Esmer et al., Olaylarla Dis Politika, pp. 417-446.
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ignored and was encouraged to ignore
all these overtures
.until she realized that preparations
for a summit meeting
between the United States, Great Britain prance and
the Soviet

:J^ey

Union meant a relaxation of tension in
East-West relations.
Out of phase with the rest of NATO, she then
sought to better
her ties with the Soviet Union, hoping especially
for
^economic cooperation

Turkey has followed an equally narrow-minded policy

toward the non-aligned countries of the world.

has been

a

This again

reflection of the "We will take whatever America

^ives, accept v/hatever she does ""mentality of Menderes.

An outstanding example of the attitude tov/ard the non-

committed nations of Asia and Africa was the 1955 Bandung
^Conference.

In the emerging rift between the pro- and anti-

West components, Turkey, followed closely by Iraq and Pakistan (all members of the

Western side.

nev;

Baghdad Pact)

,

championed the

In fact, the clash was led by the Turkish

foreign minister on one side, and Nehru of India on the other.

Dismissing neutrality as a third alternative, Turkish politicians generally belittled those pursuing such a course.

After joining NATO Turkey has manifested this policy most

systematically within the confines of the United Nations.
^^Avcioglu, Turkiye'nin Duzeni

,

p.

282.

^^Esmer et al,, Olaylarla Pis Politika, pp. 291-295.
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Initial Interpretation of the United Nations

Turkey acquired the privilege of becoming a Charter

member of the United Nations by bowing to Anglo-Saxon pressures to abandon its neutrality and delcaring war against

Germany shortly prior to the end of hostilities in 1945.
The new world organization was perceived to be the work of
the victorious democracies.

T'ji

upsurge of goodwill and

enthusiasm on the part of the Turkish government, the
press, and the people accompanied its establisliment .

They

pointed out the similarities between the principles declared
in the Charter and those tliat v;ere set forth by Ataturk in

the National Pact.^^

^he espoused "collective security"

was v/ell received, for Turks

v/ere

tion of acts of aggression.

However, the veto power of the

major states

v/as

anxious to see the preven-

taken as a sign of the privilege attached

to the great pov/ers and to the Security Council at the expense
of the smaller states and the General /isceml^ly.

fore, submitted amendments to increase the

permanent members of the Security Council.

num]:)er

Turkey, thereof non-

Another amendment

sought to keep the recommendations made by the Security Council from interfering with legal procedure in the case of a

dispute already submitted for legal settlement.

Turks also

^^Institute of International Relations of the Faculty
Sciences at the University of Ankara, Turkey
Political
of
Nations National Studies on International
United
the
and
Organizations (!Jew York: iManhattan Publishing Co. for the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1961), p. 75.
,
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proposed the inclusion in the Charter of
some reference to
principles of right and justice in maintaining
peace and
security so as "to provide a safeguard
against the settlement of international questions on the
basis of the kind of
political expediency practiced at Munich in 1939 "27
.

Enthusiasm for the organization started to dampen
as the polarization of the world crippled
its functioning.

Disappointments grew over the meager results achieved in
settling the problems in Iran, Greece, Palestine and
Indonesia.

It v;as observed that important problems

were discussed outside the United Nations among the major
states.

Too, the great pov;ers were criticized both for

ignoring the purposes and principles of the organization
and for using it as a means to enhance their own political
goals.

Such pessimism notv;ithstanding, it

agreed that the United Nations

v;as

v;as

generally

an asset to the interna-

tional community in so far as it provided a permanent forum

where nations could at least attempt to elaborate on solutions to problems, and in the process, define world public

opinion

Compatibility of Major Policy Developments and the Charter
Legally, key developments in Turkish foreign policy

^^Gonlubol, Participation in the United Nations

,

p. 4.

^^University of TVnkara, Turkey and the United Nations
pp. 92-94.

,
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have been in compliance with the principles
of the Charter.
Acceptance of the Truman aid, joining NATO,
initiating
regional cooperation arrangements like the
Balkan treaty
and the Baghdad Pact have all had their
basis in tlie need
for attaining a degree of security for the
country.

Turkey

felt that it could not rely entirely on the ineffectual

mechanisms of the United Nations.

Even at the San Francisco

Conference in 194 5, the delegate emphasized that collective
security referred to regional arrangements providing for

automatic action as long as the action
nature.

v/as

of a defensive

Turkey has regarded the treaties it signed with

the V7est as vehicles aimed at coordinating the exercise of

the right of self-defense specifically recognized in Article
51 of the Charter.

The Turkish reaction to the Security Council decision

regarding Korea was to send a combat force of 4,500 men to
join the United Nations forces.

aggression

v/as

The decision to resist

hailed as the first concrete application of

the collective security principle.

Participation in the United Nations
In general, Turkey did not pursue an active role in

the varying bodies of the United Nations

.

Middle Eastern state and a partner of the

Although both a
VJest,

infrequently elected to represent either region.

it was

The Middle

East seat was "monopolized" by the Arab states, and Turkey
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could be no match for the more advanced
and powerful V7estern
states
As far as the voting records are
concerned, Professor

Gonlubol's study concludes that "On the
questions involving
'East-West' conflict where there was considerable
solidarity
of the Western nations,

(disarmament, regulation of armaments,

Korea, Greece, admission of new meml^ers)
the V7est.

,

Turkey supported

It has never voted v;ith the Soviet bloc in any

important issue. "^^

He also shows that on issues relating

to colonialism, Turkey had aligned itself v/ith the colonial,

advanced V7est rather than

v/ith the

anticolonial

developed Asian, Arab, and African states.

,

under-

A few examples

are its rejection of including the problem of Algiers on
the agenda, its vote against the inclusion in the proposed

human rights convenant of the phrase declaring the right of
all peoples to self-determination, and its abstention on
the questions of French North African protectorates, the

treatment of persons of Indian origin, and race conflict
in

tJie

Union of South Africa.

Since Turkey was not a colonial

power, and had in fact won its independence from the hands
of the V7eGt, the consistent preference it gave the West can

be explained in terms of Turkey's connection to NATO.

After

joining this organization, Turkey has somehov; felt the

necessity to support the viev;s of the other members in each
29 Gonlubol, Participation in the United Nations, p.

160.
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foreign policy problem they came to face.

This careful

avoidance of casting votes in non-Western
directions was
later realized to be the prime cultivator
of the isolation
enveloping Turkey in the diplomatic v/orld.

PART II.

FOREIGN POLICY 7vND
THE milTED NATIONS
1960-1970

CHAPTER III
SUGGESTIONS OF CHA.NGE 1960-1963
R eaffirmation of the Ties with the
West

Despite the reputation Turkey enjoyed as a
staunch
ally of the VJest, the Revolution of May
27, 1960 was viewed
with alarm by the United States. The erroneous
reading of
the movement as a military putsch rather than
a political

rebellion was reinforced by the misguided reports received

from the American Embassy in Ankara which failed to grasp
the meaning of the socio-political dynamics of the
Turkish

society.

The next day, the State Department admitted to

being taken by surprise at the turn of events.
The leaders of the revolution moved quickly to dispel

unnecessary anxiety about the international position of
Turkey.

In a radio message broadcast to the nation and the

world, they said, in part:
\le are addressing ourselves to our allies,
friends, neighbors, and the entire v;orld: Our
aim is to remain completely loyal to the United
Nations Charter and to the principles of human
rights; the principle of peace at home and in the
world set by the great Ataturk is our flag.
We are loyal to all our alliances and
undertakings. We believe in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, and the Central Treaty Organization, and we are faithful to them.
.

.

^^New York Times, 28 May

1960.
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^^^^

'^^^^

±n the wor!I!"3i

was clear that the military leaders were
not plan:nlng to introduce substantial changes
in Turkey's foreign
-It

policies.

There were indications, however, that some
shifts

pf (emphasis

v/ere to be

•the VJestern

states, the National Unity Committee of the

expected.

In terms of the ties with

revolutionary leadership attached greater importance to
-the

concept of equality within bilateral relationships than

the previous regime had.

In a press conference in September

1960, the head of state referred to the Status of Forces

Agreement signed betv/een the United States and Turkey in
V7ithout being specific. President Gursel indicated

1954..

an intention to achieve a procedural change in the applica-

tion of the Agreement.

In 1961 a report in the New York Times

revealed that the Turkish envoy, Mr. Selim Sarper

,

while

attending the September 1960 General Assembly meeting of
the United Nations a year earlier had asked the United

States for an increased Turkish role in deciding the duty

status of an American soldier committing a crime in Turkey.

According to the 1954 Agreement, an offender was not
accountable to Turkish jurisdiction if his command decided
he was on duty, and cleared him by issuing a duty certificate.
3

Esmer et al., Qlaylarla Pis Politika

"^^New York Tines,

4

June 1961.

,

p.

345.
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^er

the years this privilege of defining
the duty status
ana determining it had, in the eyes of
the public, been
-Repeatedly abused.

The State Department probably did
not

pay much serious attention to the subject
initially, but
-found its hand forced in face of the
bitter anti-Americani sm

'which developed in the aftermath of the
Cyprus crisis,
-^'or

It was not until 19 6 8 that

Vithin the framev/ork of
"^The

a

compromise was reached

a new Duty Status Agreement.

programs of the first and the second coalition

'"governments of 1961 and 1962 reaffirmed Turkish commitments
^tb

political, economic, and military cooperation with the

West on the basis of the principles of equality and indepen-

^ence. 33

Economically, Turkey received credits from the

teited States and Germany for its first Five-year Development
Plan.

In 1962, aid

v;as

institutionalized when the Organiza-

%-ibn for Economic Cooperation and Development created a

Rjbhsortium to assist Turkish development.

A year later, the

Common Market and Turkey signed an Agreement of Association
"which foresaw gradual but full Turkish membership in that

Organization.

In return, Turkey continued its military

•support of NATO.

The Sixth Fleet paid regular visits to

'^Turkish harbors, but more importantly, Turkey became an
^'ardent

supporter of the idea to create a new multilateral

•nuclear force within NATO.

Politically, Turkey and its allies

'•^Ismail Arar, Ilukumet Programlari 1920-1965

Programs
p.

312, p.

1920-1965]
340.

(Istanbul:

[Government
Burcak Yaymevi, 1968),
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faaintained high-level and frequent
contacts, and in 1963

Turkey acceded to the Partial Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty.
However, the most striking demonstration
of Turkish solidarity
^.ith the West occurred during
the Cuban missile crisis of
October 1962.
The NATO allies of the United States were
informed

about the Soviet armament deliveries to Cuba
in Septem].er
1962, and were urged to stop their commercial shipping

to

Puba.

The Turkish government then intercepted ten
ships

plying betv/een Soviet harbors and Cuba, "requesting"
them
to divert their destination. VThile the promptness of this
<^poperation with the United States was praised in the Congj^ess,

it was learned that Great Britain, reported to have

the largest share of Cuban shipments among NATO members,
i;e^jected,

s|iipping.

along with Norway, any interference with its
"^^

A month
o^.-

later, the American discovery of the presence

Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba was followed by the

arrival of two letters from Khrushchev.

The first letter

offered to withdraw the missiles in Cuba if the United
States agreed to life the quarantine
invade the island.

,

and pledged not to

The second letter, hov/ever, introduced

a new element into the bargain.

The Soviet Union would with-

draw the Cuban missiles and pledge not to invade Turkey
^^New York Times, 28 September

1962.
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provided that the United States
withdraw its missiles in
Turkey and pledge not to invade
Cuba.^^
Suddenly, the fifteen Jupiter missiles
that had been
placed near Izmir with the warm
approval of Turkey in 1957,
the year of the successful launch
of a satellite into
earth's orbit by the Soviets, x^ere drawn
into the focus
of a superpower conflict. Only two
other NATO allies,
Great Britain and Italy, had accepted to host
these nucleartipped missiles on their land, and neither was
a neighbor
to the Soviets. VThile capable of reaching
!!oscow and the

industrial Urals, these fifteen missiles constituted less
than three per cent of the first strike capability of
the

United States.-^

Furthermore, due to their extreme vulner-

ability they had no potential for a second strike.

Finally,

in view of the fast developing American military technology,

the missiles were considered obsolete long before they

became operational.

President Kennedy had in fact ordered

their removal in early 1961, but as the Turks balked,
the matter was dropped at

tliat

point.

-^"^

Although the crisis

gave the Soviets a good opportunity to draw a parallel between
the missiles in Cuba and Turkey, the latter did not prove to

be the central issue; in any case, they were removed by 1963.
35

Allison, Essence of Decision

36ibid., p. 44.
37ibid.

,

pp. 141-142.

,

pp. 221-224.
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Nevertheless, the initial Turkish
acceptance to host
them not only had significant
implications but also was
quite detrimental to national security.
First, since the
missiles had no retaliatory potential,
they had
to be

utilized before being hit.

This, in fact, was in contradic-

tion V7ith Turkey's official view of
NATO as a strictly
defensive organization. Second, far from
being a deterrent,
their first-strike-only capability actually
represented
an

open invitation to the Soviets to precipitate
an attack in
order to eliminate them. Since in accepting such
an option
the costs to be accrued would be higher than the
advantages,

the Turkish General Staff must have acted on a series
of

assumptions resembling the following:

First, more arms meant

more strength, and hence, increased security via-a~vis
the Soviets; second, the missiles would be used in a confron-

tation between the Soviet Union and Turkey only; third, the

United States v/ould step in to help its ally in such a case;
fourth, knowing this, the Soviets would avoid an attack on

Turkey.

The significance of the Cuban crisis for Turkey is

that it exposed the primitiveness of the first assumption,

and the naivete of the second.

Tv;o

years later, the Cyprus

crisis shattered the legitimacy of the third.
If the military command learned that possession of

arms and weapons did not alv;ays bring security, but could

jeopardize it very suddenly on account of an issue not even

concerning Turkey, the political leaders realized that

v/hile

the nation's fate was intertwined with
those of its NATO
allies, its security interests were not
necessarily so.

For the first time, the press and the elite
engaged in
a heated critique of the extensive
American role within
Turkish foreign policy. Especially the left,
newly emerging
within the freedom of expression guaranteed by
the 1961

Constitution, elaborated on these previously unfamiliar
themes

Limited Improvement in Relations with the Soviet Union
The period beginning with the May 1960 revolution

was not marked by drastic changes in foreign policy.
less, Turkish leaders showed

an-.

Nonethe-

increased willingness to

move toward a policy of limited accommodation with the Soviet
Union
As mentioned before, the de-Stalinization and

nevr

forcing policy initiated by Khrushchev after 1953 had included
a peace offensive directed to Turkey.

Although traditional

suspicions and Western disapproval had not allov/ed Turkey
to be enticed by promises of peaceful coexistence, by the end
of the decade the Menderes government was prepared to adopt
a more flexible attitude.

By this time, the Western states

had shown an interest in cooperation

v/ith the

Soviet Union;

in fact, a summit meeting betv/een the United States, the

Soviet Union, Great Britain and France had been set for
1960 in Paris.

Encouraged by this

nevr thav/,

xMay

and also hoping
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to revive the bankrupt economy by
securing long-promised
Soviet aid, Menderes had asked the
Foreign Ministry to
initiate the contacts.
in April 1960, the two governments

officially announced their decision for
an exchange of
visits by their prime ministers. Menderes
's visit had been
scheduled for July. As it turned out, the
dramatic events
of that May 1960, namely, the shooting
down of an American
reconnaissance plane over Soviet territory, and
the army

instigated revolution in Turkey, prevented the
Paris summit
and tl-ie Menderes trip, respectively.
In any case, progress toward normalized
relations contin

ued.

Turkey now felt ready to accept as a basis of agreement

the 1956 Soviet suggestion that her ties with the Western

alliance ought not to obstruct the improvement of relations
betv/een the two neighbors.

To the Soviets, the termination

of the Menderes era with its excessive closeness to the

United States presented an opportunity to sound out the tendencies within the

nev;

leadership of soldiers.

Khrushchev's

letter of June 28, 1960 to General Gursel in part read:
it is our deep conviction that the most
sincere relations betv/een our two neighbor
countries would develop if Turkey emisarked upon
the road to neutrality.
This would only benefit
the country.
Turkey would receive an opportunity
to use her resources, not for \-jar preparations,
on which huge funds have so far been squandered,
but for raising the level of the country's national
economy and the wellbeing of its people. Military
expenditures, Mr. Prime Minister, are a bottomless
pit and not every country can endure the burden
"

.

.

.
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of them and develop its economy at the
same time.
•

•

•

•

This, of course, is not a condition for
beginning the improvement of our relations.
Nor
are we striving to worsen Turkey's relations
with
America or other Western powers.
.

.

.

.

Your desire that Turkey, in spite of the
binding nature of the existing commitments and
alliances, should pursue an independent policy,
meets V7ith the understanding of the Soviet
government
.

.

.

.

The main thing is not to search for questions on which we disagree. On the contrary,
we must search for points on which our views'
coincide so as to advance along the road to
rapprochement "38
.

.

.

.

.

In his reply, General Gursel noted that Turkey's

alliance commitments allowed her "enough leev/ay" for

improving relations v/ith the Soviet Union.

However, he

added
"I do not think that the pursuance of a neutral
policy can free the government from military
expenditures.
If that were so, then such
countries as Sv;eden, Switzerland or India for
that matter v/ould have no military budgets.

... In reality, liquidation, or at least
reduction of military expenditures can be
made possible, not be neutrality, but by the
establishment of a system of universal disarmament with an effective control mechanism, which
would ensure the security of all the countries
of the world, vmether large or small, against
any aggression on the part of any state.
Until the creation of such a system of international disarm.ament
... no state can renounce
.

,

.

^

Documents on International Affairs 1960 quoted
in Ferenc Vali, TlTe~Turkish Straits and NATO Hoover
Institution StudFes 32 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press,
1972) , pp. 302-305.
,

,

55

the means of ensuring its
security.
Turk^v
prompted by this lawful concern,
^^malns
'l^yal
to Its policy of nerpl^ership in
collective
security systems. "39

Despite mutual recognition of a basis
for cooperation,
the next two years did not produce
much progress. The
Soviets sent a note of warning when the
Jupiter missiles
were being installed in 1961, and called
again on both the
Turkish and Greek governments in 1962 to ban
atomic weapons
and rockets from the Balkans and the Adriatic."^"
They

sharply denounced the Turkish decision to halt shipping
to
Cuba in the v/ake of the October 1962 crisis. And,
certainly, the proposal of Khrushchev to barter the withdrawal
of their missiles in Cuba with the withdrawal of American

missiles in Turkey must have brought home to Turks much more

effectively than any Soviet note the acute irritation of
Moscov/ to be ringed by the offensive weapons of its rival

along its borders.

During the same period there were constant rumors
about Soviet offers of credit.

The Turkish government,

although very eager to obtain foreign credits in order to
get its first Five-year Devalopm.ent Plan off the ground,

did not conclude a credit agreement with the Soviet Union
at this time.
•^^

Ibid

.

However, the trade capacity reached a new

,

p.

306,

^^New York Times,

7

June 1962.
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level, and a minor railroad
agreement went into effect in
1961 linking the two sides of the
Caucasian border.

The four

coalition governments formed in

19fil,

1962,

1963 and 1965 pledged to develop the
relations with the

northern neighbor based on mutual respect
and good neighborliness, and in accordance with the
existing international
commitments. ^2

in line with this new policy of better

relations, and upon an invitation of the Soviet
side, a
parliamentary delegation, headed by Mr. Suat Urguplu,

the

Speaker of the Senate, arrived in Moscow for an
official

goodwill visit.

According to the reports in the press,

Khrushchev, Brezhnev and the other leaders repeated to the

delegation at every opportunity that since the Soviet Union
had no demands on. Turkey, it was possible to revive the

friendship that existed betv/een the

tv;o

countries during the

Ataturk-Lenin era, and that not only could the commercial
41

The Institute of International Relations, University
of Ankara, Th e Turkish Ye a rl-.ook of In ternatio nal Relations
1961 (Ankara: Ajans Turk Press, 1963), p. 242.
42

The new electoral system of proportional representation designed to prevent any party from gaining an overwhelming parliamentary majority coupled v;ith the increase
in the number of political parties competing for the votes,
and the controversy over the issue of amnesty for the deposed
rienderes regime resulted in a series of unstable coalition
cabinets. The 1961 coalition was between the Republican and
the Justice Parties; in 1962, the Republican party united
with tv;o smaller centrist parties; the third coalition v;as an
alignment of the Republicans and the Independents while the
1965 coalition saw a short-lived cooperation betv/een the Justice
Party and the tv;o small parties. However, a degree of continuity was provided by the fact that three of the four coalition?
V7ere headed by prime minister Inonu.
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relations be increased but that the Soviet Union

v;as

capable of extending economic aid under much better conditions than

v;as

offered by the VJest.^^

talks, Mr, Urguplu declared:

"I told

After one of these
[Khrushchev] that it

is not possible to expect an immediate and important
progress

in the Soviet-Turkish relations "^^
.

It will be useful for future reference to note here

the developments in the early sixties concerning the

establishment of a multilateral nuclear submarine force
v^ithin NATO,

Turkey had shov/n receptiveness to the

^erican initiative from the

start, and evidently regarded

it as an appropriate substitute for the Jupiter missiles,
in April 1963 a special representative of President Kennedy,
Mr..

Livingstone Marchand, arrived in Ankara to consult

with the Turkish officials on this project.

His visit was

followed by a Soviet note in May, the contents of v/hich were

revealed indirectly within the Turkish reply dated early
July,
by-

Soon after, the reply to the Soviets was made public

the Information Office of the Foreign Ministery.

It

rejected the Soviet proposal that the Mediterranean Sea be
declared a nuclear and missile-free area, and at the same time,

repeated the Turkish desire for a complete and general disarmament under effective control,

The subject might have

^"^Esmer et al,, Olaylarla Pis Politika

,

p,

454,

Institute of International Relations, University
of Ankara, The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations,
^"^The
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been discussed during the visit of the
parliamentary delegation in June. Interestingly, after the
eruption of the
Cyprus crisis, the Turks found it necessary
to reconsider
their previous enthusiasm for the nuclear
submarine
force,

and in fact, informed the United States of ending
their

cooperation from the project.
During the four year period from 1960 to the end of
1963, Turkey's relations with the Soviet-guided states of

Europe did not register any significant developments.
Cominercial agreements v/ith Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bul-

garia, among others, were signed on a regular basis.

Al-

though Turkey has alv;ays been interested in the Balkan
states of Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia due to their

geographical proximity to both the Soviet Union and the

European Turkey, the area did not receive top-priority
attention

Turkish diplomacy.

i-zithin

Relations

slavia and Romania have been friendly,

other hand,

v/as

v/ith

Yugo-

Bulgaria, on the

regarded as a staunch ally of Iloscow.

sprinkling of Turks live in all throe countries,
of the Ottoman rule of previous centuries.

A

a legacy

The treatment

of the Turkish minorities has become a sensitive issue in

the case of Bulgaria.

VThereas the Balkan region did not

receive much attention, except for friendly relations with
1963

Tmkara University Press, 1965), p. 320.

(Ankara:
"^^Ibid.

,

p.

322.
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Yugoslavia, in the foreign policy sections
of the four
government programs covering this period,
both the 1962
and 1963 programs specifically refer
to the uncooperative
attitude of the Bulgarian government and
the anti-Turk
propaganda of their press and the leaders.
At one point,

Ankara felt it necessary to caution Bulgaria
that it would
break ties unless the discriminatory treatment

of the esti-

mated 900,000 Turks improved.^'

In 1966, there was a notice-

able relaxation of tension with Bulgaria, and in
general,
an improvement in Turkey's ties with pro-Soviet countries
of Europe, all accompanying the Turkish-Soviet rapprochement

ment follov/ing the Cyprus crisis.
The Third World Policy and the United Nations

Just as Turkey came to entertain, in the early 19 60

's,

•

its first doubts about the soundness of having very close

ties with the United States, and was prompted to turn a

more receptive, albeit cautious ear to the Soviets, the
official attitude toward long-time neutrals

,

nev/ly indepen-

dent non-bloc countries, and those striving for independence

underwent

a

modest change.

During the 19 61 budget discussions

in the National Assembly, the foreign minister Selim Sarper

elaborated first on the situation of the developing countries.
^^Arar,

I

lukumet Programlari

^^^New York Times,

9

,

p.

372, p. 401.

September 1962.
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« departure from

the customary procedures of official

jyronouncements.

Indicating the closeness felt by his coun-

t-ry

toward those struggling for independence and freedom,

m., Sarper denounced the fact that they had become the
J>ri.zes

in a political and military competition sustained

by the division of the world into two "fronts."

He called

for the support of those efforts exerted by the United
:Nations in order to alleviate the situation, and expressed

the hope that the developing countries will be supplied
'the

economic and technical aid they ask for exclusively

out of their free will/^
Another enlightened note was sounded in the 1961

election manifesto of the Republican Party which failed to
achieve a majority in the parliament, but led the three coali-

tion governments of the next three years.

The manifesto

explained that while Turkey could not lead a neutralist

policy due to its historical development and geographical
considerations, it would nevertheless follow a policy of

friendship v/ith those countries \7hich, based on similar
reasoning, are of the opinion that they can adopt neutrality

.

^

This attitude was markedly different from that of the Menderes
era of the 1950' s

v/hen the

Turks regarded the neutralist

countries with a touch of contempt as demonstrated during
^^Esmer et al., Olaylarla Pis Politika
''^Ibid., p.

349.

,

p.

346.

^
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the 1955 Bandung Conference.

There were several attempts at increased
cooperation
with developing and far-away countries.
Good will missions
were sent to Africa, representation in Mali
was upgraded to
the ambassadorial level, Ethiopian and
Japanese ships called
on Turkish ports, and a Mexican parliamentary
Relegation was
received in /oikara. Earlier, the revolutionary
military

leadership of the National Unity Committee had declared
its

solidarity for the Algerian nationalists fighting the

French

a.rmy.

A foreign nev;spaper revealed the

nev/s

that

General Gursel had offered his services as a mediator
betv/een France and the Algerians, but that the suggestion

had been rejected inf erentially by a spokesman of the French

Foreign Ministry.

Ankara shov/ad its sympathy for the

Algerian cause by aiding the refugees in M.orocco.

Premier

Inonu warmly hailed deGaulle for his decision to grant

Algeria independence after a seven-year war.
Successive governments emphasized the special closeness

between Turkey and the

?.rab states.

The Libyan ambassador

applauded the decision of the revolutionary government to
improve relations \/ith the Arabs, and noted the possibilities
for cooperation in the fields of econom.ic development and

social welfare.^-^
^^

Relations v/ith the Middle Eastern Arabs,

New York Tim.es

,

18 SeptemJi^er 1960.

^^Ankara University, Turkish Yearbook 1961, p. 231.
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however, oscillated.

Turkey recognized Syria when she
with-

drew from the United Arab Republic.

Regarding this as a

rebuke, Egypt broke diplomatic relations
with Turkey which,
however, were restored tv7o years later.
V7ith Iraq, there
was a short-lived flareup over the
Kurdish problem.
In

chase of the revolting Kurds, Iraqi planes
had bombed

Turkish posts at the frontier several times.

retaliated by downing an airplane, and

v;as

Turkey

charged by Iraq

of allov/ing outlaws and criminals to use its
territory as
a base for creating trouble in Northern Iraq.

Ever sensi-

tive to this problem, the Soviet Union warned Turkey, Iran

and Syria that their "interference" would constitute

definite danger to the peace in the area.

a

The matter came

to a close as Turkey promptly offered to submit the dispute

to an international commission for arbitration, and premier
Inonu, rejecting any Turkish wish to interfere in Iraq,

emphasized his country's good

V'/ill

tov/ard the Arab and

Soviet neighbors.^*"
The foreign policy of Ankara between 1960-1963 with
its unchanged basis accompanied by a few minor shifts

faithfully mirrored in the United Nations.

v;as

The changes

were observed in the attitude towards the North African
Moslems

v;ho v;ere

trying to assert their independence at home

Turkey voted at the United Nations to support the Algerians,
^^New York Times, 18 July 196 3.
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gp^rtime subjects of the Ottoman Empire,
against the French,
Similarly, on the question of the
f ;png-time ally.
French
oqcupation of Bizerte, Turkey sided with
Tunisia along with
mny uncommitted nations. In fact, the Turkish
delegate,

Mr. Turgut Menemencioglu expressing
his concern in the
^,9qurity Council, offered a draft resolution
calling for

immediate cease-fire and the opening of early
negotiations
£or peace.
a^n

Turkish sympathies for the newly emerging North

African states did not stretch to include, for example,
Qoa.

and the other Portuguese colonial enclaves in the Indian

s^ubcontinent.

V^en India militarily invaded these enclaves,

Tv^key joined the ranks of the United States, Great Britain,
^pA/^^^^^^

the. Security Council and co-sponsored a reso-

lution for an immediate cease-fire and withdrav;al of Indian
troops.

Such active participation in condemning threats to

t^^ overseas possessions of colonial states was in fact a

cpntinuation of the imprudent Turkish policy of extending
uriqritical support to its NATO allies in their problems of

foreign policy.
The general tendency to side with the West was also

exhibited in such non-urgent questions as the membership of
Communist Chinese, and the structural change in the executive
branch of the United Nations.

Turkey opposed both the

Chinese membership, and the Soviet suggestion of replacing
the Secretary General v/ith a three-man directorate serviced
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by a staff shaped according to the
three major political
groupings of world states. However, when
acting as the

president of the Security Council on the
basis of the rotating nonpermenant membership. The Turkish
representative
worked out a compromise on the problem of the
Soviet-backed
membership of Outer Mongolia, and the American-supported

membership of Mauritania.

The compromise arrangement was

accepted by all sides as not violating the principle
against

pairing the admission of controversial candidates, and
both countries

v/ere

admitted by the General Assembly.

It can be said that the Turkish participation in
the fifteenth to the eighteenth sessions betv/een 19 60 and

1963 of the General Assem})ly did not posit any outstanding

marks, but

v;as

largely confined to the customary speeches,

committee work, and press conferences.

The dramatic change

in the significance of this international forum to Turkish

interests was marked in December 19 63 with the sudden flareup of communal warfare betv/een the Cypriot

Greeks and

Turks, and the skillful presentation of the ethnic conflict

by the Cypriot

government to the United Nations.

CHAPTER IV
THE CYPRUS CRISIS

Background 1571-1960
The island of Cyprus lies in the eastern Mediterranean

forty miles from the southern coast of Turkey, and 500 miles

from Greece.

Eighty percent of the population are Greek

Orthodox, and 20 percent are Turkish-speaking Moslems.
Due to its strategic position the island during its

history from 300 B.C. until 1960 had come under the rule
of the Ptolem.ies, the Romans, the Byzantines, the Lusignans,

the Venetians, the Turks, and the British.'

The Ottomans

took it over from the Venetians in 1571, and were to rule

over it for the next three centuries.

They restored the

supremacy of the Orthodox archbishop, and abolished the

system of serfdom among the peasants.

In time, the arch-

bishop and the Greek notables enhanced their influence, and

enjoyed direct access to the Sultan,
In 1878, when the Empire

v/as

fast v/eakening and had

just lost territory to the Russians, the Ottomans signed a

Convention with the British consenting to their occupation
and administration of the island of Cyprus in return for
A Place of Arms
^•^Robert Stephens, Cyprus:
Praeger,
1966),
p. 22.
A.
York: Frederick

(New
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British agreenient to defend the
territories of the Sult^:an
against Russian encroachments. An
annex stipulated the termination of the 1878 Convention if Russia
restored to the
Ottomans its recent conquests. And
thus while juridically
Cyprus remained a part of the Ottoman
Empire, in reality
it offered England control over the
island and

the sea route

through the Suez Canal to India.

Throughout the colonial phase of its history, the
Cypriots of Greek origin formulated their call for Enosis—

uniting the island

v/ith

mainland Greece.

Predictably, each

such call would draw a protest from the Cypriots of
Turkish

origin who in turn advocated the return of Turkish sovereignty

over the island,

When Britain introduced the first colonial

constitution in 1882, the Turkish Cypriots opposed self-

government which v;ould not be based on a complete equality
of the

tv;o

comjnunities on the grounds that this v/ould put

them at the mercy of the Greek majority, whose aim of Enosis
was contrary to their own interests.

Britain, on its part,

viewed Enosis as incompatible with its rule over the island.
For this reason, she found it expedient to exploit the bi-

communal differences in Cyprus.

For example, bi-communally

administered education not only perpetuated segregation,

but also reinforced the historical ties each community shared

with its mother country.
The first World War found England and the Ottoman

Empire confronting each other.

England formally annexed
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.Cyprus in 1914; this move was
recognized by the new national-

ist government of Turkey in the 1923
Lausanne Treaty.
Interestingly, Britain had offered the island
to the Greek
government during the first year of the War in
exchange
for Greek participation on the Allied
side, but the Greeks
had rejected the offer preferring not to
expose the newly

acquired Balkan territory to further risks in a new
war.
Between the two V7orld

V7ars

Britain emerged as the

,

dominant po\;er in the Middle East.

Having now several

footholds in the area the strategic importance of Cyprus

was no longer very significant.

The bi-communal nature of

the island continued along with an increased momentum for

Panhellenism.

This was to be reinforced by the principle

of self-determination which was v/idely accepted by the

international community at the end of the second World War.
Indeed, the two concepts of anti-colonialism and self<3e

termination were sanctioned by the Charter of the United

Nations.

However, by then the British power had started

its decline, and consequently, the importance of maintaining

control over Cyprus

v/as

During the 1950

's

once again on the rise.
the confrontation between the Cypriot

Greeks and the British entered a new phase marked by revolts
and open violence.

The Enosis movement was conducted by the

ethnarch of the island, Archbishop Makarios III, and George
Grivas

,

a

Cypriot

officer in the Greek army who had come

back to Cyprus to initiate terrorist activity against the
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British,

For that purpose, the two men
formed an under,ground guerilla organization
known as the EOKA (National
Organization of Cypriot Fighters)
The political framework of the
fighting on the island
was widened only when Greece officially
adopted the cause
Pf the Cypriot Greeks. So far Turkey
had regarded the
developments as a domestic matter between
the government
of the island and its Greek community.
fJhe felt obliged to
take an active part in the question when
Greece submitted it
to the United Nations in 1954 as a colonial
problem

involving the principle of self-determination.^"^ Turkey

advanced the legalistic argument of retrocession, indicating
^hat in the event of a cliange in the status-quo as determined

by the Turkish recognition of British sovereignty over

Cyprus in the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, she would have grounds
for asking that the island be returned to her.

The General

Assembly, duo to intense British pressures against having
the issue discussed in that forum, simply recommended that

it be negotiated by the parties directly involved.

The diplomatic impasse prompted the EOKA to initiate
a v;ave of guerilla attacks directed at

stration.

tlie

In 1955, Britain invited Greece and Turkey to

London to discuss the situation.

Makarios protested the

absence of representation for the Cypriot
54

British admini-

Vali, Bridge Across the Bosporus

,

p.

236.

Greeks. Neither
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was Greece pleased by the inclusion
of Turkey.

She

pressed for self-determination for
Cyprus which was the
demand for Enosis presented in a form
more palatable to
international opinion.

Britain refused the application of

the principle of self-determination
to Cyprus, knowing
also the total inacceptability of Enosis
for the Turks.
In return, Greece rejected the proposal
of London for a

limited self-government supervised by Britain,
Greece, and
Turkey.

The London conference was suspended in September

1955.

This time, the resumption of hostilities on the island

spread along intercommunal lines.

Turkey, now determined

to take a stronger stand, brought forth the argument that
she would not oppose the principle of self-determination for
the island provided that it be applied to the Greek and

Turkish communities separately.

"...

As one study indicated,

the Turkish argument rested on Article 73 of the

United IJations Charter, according to which the development
of self-government was to be encouraged in accordance v/ith
the 'particular circumstances of each territory and its

peoples.

The 'particular circumstance' of the peoples

in this case, the existence of

tv;o

v/as,

distinct communities,

while the 'particular circumstance' of the territory was
the island's geographical proximity to Anatolia.

According

to Article 73, the will of the Turkish coirjnunity of Cyprus
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and the security of Turkey had to be
taken into considera55
tion."
Since the application of this reasoning
would
result in each comiTiunity s choosing to
unite with its respective mainland, the proposal came to be
known as Taksim
•

(the Turkish word for partition)

While the fighting continued a combination of
factors

transformed the conflict to a new phase.

Concerned that

Makarios, Greece, and Britain may reach a settlement on the
side, Turkey changed its stance from retrocession to partition.

For Makarios, however, this

British rule.

v/as

certainly worse than

On the other hand, not only did Britain show

an interest in the idea of Taksim

,

but also Makarios could

not expect Greece to antagonize a much stronger Turkey

beyond a certain limit.

Furthermore, not much progress was

achieved in the United Nations,

In February 1957, the

Political Committee of the General Assembly had expressed the
hope for a resumption of negotiations.

Ten months later, a

similar resolution added the hope for the application of the

principle of self-determination.

The resolution seemed to

favor the Greeks although it failed to get the two-thirds

majority necessary for a recommendation.

By December 1958

however, Greeks saw the defeat of their resolutions in the

General Assembly.
55
p.

Finally, the British on their part, had

University of Ankara, Turkey and the United Nations,

196.
56

Stephens, Cyprus

p.

150, p.

152, p.

159.
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to the view that sovereignty
over a few bases rather
than the whole island would be
sufficient for their strategic needs.
coiue

Assessing the factors above and realizing
that Enosis
aid not need to be achieved promptly
and in one step, Makar lOS
indicated that an independent Cyprus would
be an acceptable
solution to the crisis. This led, in 1959,
to an immediate

round of negotiations in Zurich, between the Greek
and
Turkish prime ministers, Karamanlis and nenderes.

The dis-

cussions were then moved to London where the prime ministers
were joined by their foreign ministers, the leaders of
the

'Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus, and the
representa-

tives of Britain.
<ot

The initialed agreements formed the basis

three multilateral treaties, and a constitution which was

^drafted within a year, making Cyprus an independent Republic
-on

August 1960.
Before explaining the essence and the basic tenents

'of

these documents, it is necessary to realize that Cyprus

is basically
~A

a regional

problem betv/een Turkey and Greece.

brief look at the historical entanglement of these two

peoples

v;ill

help to underline this dispute as one among

many v/ithin a relationship of traditional adversity
-roots go back five centuries.

v;hose

The Byzantine Empire had

:reached the fifteenth century besieged by internal disorder
as a result of the bitter feud with the Latins.

Its demise

came in 145 3 v;hen the Ottoman Turks conquered Constantinople.
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Orthodox Christian religion gave way to Islam,
although
<^1 the non-!Ioslem subjects of the Ottoman Empire continued
±o pursue their livelihood under the tolerant
institution of

'!Phe

inillet— a system which allowed the non-Islamic religious
(Communities to administer their own cultural, religious,
and

private legal affairs.
this system

was intact

v/as

the Greek millet whose cultural heritage

v/hen

nationalism began to spread in the nine-

±eenth century.
tthe

One of the early beneficiaries of

The Greeks then v/ere inspired to resurrect

former Byzantine Empire, aiming to bring together all

-living Greeks, a vision knov;n as the Megali Idea.

The

xevolt led to the establishment in 1832 of an independent
^reek state vrhich increased its territory at the expense of

±he Ottoman Empire over the next century.

The high point

Df the vision came during the Turkish war of independence
!(19;19~1922)

when the Turkish nationalist government of

^aturk was fighting
<and

the British, the French, the Italians,

their collaborator, the Sultan.

The Greeks were lured

Irnto the war by the British offer of "important concessions

on the coasts of Asia Minor."

Tempted by the possibility of

fulfilling the Panhellenic ideal, and even reaquiring Istanbul, the Greeks embarked upon a massive invasion of Western
Anatolia,

In the course of the ensuing v/ar, the Allies quick-

ly established truces on several fronts, whereas the Greek
army penetrated inland.

The result was the decimation of half

of its forces, with the remaining half driven back to the
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Aegean.

Thus the birth of the new Turkish state
marked the
^nd of the irredentist Hegali Idea
.

The independence and the territorial integrity
of the
Turkish Republic was internationally acknowledged
by the
1923 Treaty of Lausanne which also settled the
outstanding

problems between Turkey and Greece.

The two countries

initiated a mass exchange of populations deemed necessary
after "the murderous events of the Greek invasion and

subsequent Turkish liberation of Anatolia"

tlie

when the safety

pf the coexisting Turks and Greeks seemed endangered.

How-

ever, Athens and Ankara agreed not to uproot the Turkish

enthnic minorities in VJestern Thrace and on the islands,
and the Greeks in Istanbul.
(except for

tv;o

Greece kept the Aegean islands

near the Dardanelles' entrance), but agreed

not to militarize four of them lying especially close to the
Turkish coast.

The Dodecanese Islands remained in the hands

of Italy, while Turkey recognized British sovereignty over

Cyprus

Between 1930 and 1933, and under the able leaderships
pf Venizelos and Ataturk, Greece and Turkey normalized their

relationship signing two treaties and a friendship pact.
They collaborated further by foming with Yugoslavia the

Balkan Entente in 1934.
During the second World War, Turkey remained neutral

while Greece was overrun by Germany.

The relation

v/as

also

strained when Ankara adopted and quickly rescinded a tax
^''vali, Bridge Across the Bosporus, p.

221.
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measure discriminatory against the minorities.

At the same

time, hov/ever, Turkey sent humanitarian help to
Greece and

allowed the use of her territory in the support of Greek
guerillas.

A bitter pill to swallow for Ankara after the

war was the cession by Italy to Greece of the Dodecanese
Islands including the island of Rhodes.

This certainly

upset the balance in the Aegean, but in face of the dis-

pleasure caused by her wartime neutrality in the eyes of
the Allies, coupled by the newly emerging Soviet threats,

Turkey could not launch a protest at a diplomatically weak
moment.

After 1945, ties of friendship flourished once again.

Both countries were covered by the Truman Doctrine, both
joined NATO about the same time and cooperated closely

within it, and both were recipients of considerable 2\merican
aid.

Together with Yugoslavia, they again established a

short-lived Balkan Defense Pact (see p.29
the

tv70

)

Unfortunately,

states headed for a confrontation over Cyprus v/hen

Greece formally announced her support for the Enosis demands
of the Cypriot

Greeks and their leader, Makarios.

Turks, the desire to unite Cyprus with Greece

reminiscent of the previous Megali Idea

v/as

To the

clearly

.

For the period of the 1955-1958 EOKA struggle, the

mutual aims of Greece and the Greek Cypriot

leadership were

first and foremost, to annex Cyprus with Greece; second, to
end the British hegemony; and third, to oppose the Turkish
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prpposal to Taksim (partition)
gypriot

.

For Turkey and the Turkish

on the other hand, Enosis was
to be opposed by
all i^eans. The Turks would not have
objected to continued
British rule which perpetuated the
bi-communal nature of the
island. And the Taksim thesis was open
to modification.
,

The Turkish determination to prevent Enosis
was and is
grounded in a number of reasons which might
be grouped under
three categories: A) Strategic, B) Political,
C) Historical.
h) The strategic reasoning is twofold.
First, the geographic

location of Cyprus is considered crucial to Turkey's

security especially during a time of war.
the minister of foreign affairs

(1955),

In the words of

"In case of a war,

the aefcnse force of Turkey can be externally supplied

pnly through our southern and western harbors in the Mediterranean.

The western harbors of Turkey are unfortunately

in the sphere of influence of a probable enemy, so that Turkey

can be supplied only through its southern harbors.

This

situation had clearly materialized during the second World
War.

Keeping this reality in mind, the starting points of

the infrastructure

netv,'ork

that feeds Turkey are all located

in the southern tov/ns like Antalya, Ilersin, Yumurtalik, and

I^kenderun.

Indeed, even the fuel needs of Istanbul are

served by a pipeline from the southern coast.

And all these

southern harbors are under the protection of the Cyprus
island.

Whoever rules that island also commands the protec-

tion of these Turkish harbors.

If at the same time, he also
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possesses the Aegean islands, a de facto
encirclement of
Turkey will be achieved. No country
can base
its total

security on any one state no matter how
friendly or
allied. "^^
Second, the balance of power between Turkey
and Greece
in the Aegean and the Mediterranean is at
issue.

As arranged

by the treaty of Lausanne, Greece kept the islands,
many of
which she had nibbled away from the Ottoman Empire
(Crete,

for example)

,

but agreed not to militarize those lying within

a few miles of the Western coast of Turkey.

The disadvan-

tageous position of the latter considerably worsened
set of islands, the Dodecanese (including PJiodes)

,

v/hen a

was

ceded by Italy to Greece after the second V7orld War.

Greece

can easily use these islands to close the Aegean to navigation, and thus cut off access to the Turkish straits and

Istanbul.

Ankara feels it has every reason to be adamant

that the existing imbalance not be further aggravated

Ijy

allov/ing Greece to acquire another strategic foothold in the

eastern Mediterranean.
B)

The political reasoning follows closely the strate-

gic considerations relevant to the rejection of Enor^is
In estimating the political future of Greece, Turkey pursued
a conseirvative line,

and assumed that the future developments

58 Esmer et al., Olaylarla Pis Politika, pp.

368-369.
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iin

her neighbor 's politics might be directly contrary to the

Western orientation of Turkey.
^earlier Greece
;A

x/as

After all, only a decade

on the verge of a Communist takeover.

iregime hostile to Ankara would certainly be in a position

-.to

create innumerable difficulties for Turkey, considering

the strategic advantages Greece enjoys in the Aegean Sea.
:I:f

Cyprus

Greek territory, the political climate of

v/ere

.Athens v/ould necessarily be reflected in the island; v/hereas,

-without Enosis

,

Turkey could hope to exert some influence

over Cyprus even if Greece

V7ere to

become a political adver-

.sary,
rC)

What can be grouped as arguments based on historical

^reasoning are more varied.

First, the Turks point to the

"•^jommunal nature", of the island,
(Of

rooted in the millet system

the Ottomans that has come dovm to the present from the

.sixteenth century.

The preceding colonial phase

v/as

also

marked by the British recognition of the presence of two equal
.communities on Cyprus.
•that

The Turks are strongly convinced

neither community should exercise control over the other.

?he matter rests on a basis of two distinct communities

enjoying equal rights and privileges, and cannot, they claim,
he approached from the point of view of a majority-minority
jrela-bionship.
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Vali, Bridge Across the Bosporus

,

p.

243.

^°A lucid discussion of this issue is to be found in
Christian Heinze, "The Cyprus Conflict: The ^'^estern Peace
IV) p.
System is Put to the Test." Turkish Yearbook 1963 (Vol.

5
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Second, the Turkish government is seriously concerned

about the safety and the v/ell-being of the island-Turks in
case of Enosis

.

The memory of the Greek performance during

the occupation of western Anatolia is enough motivation for

not leaving the fate of the Cypriot Turks completely in the

hands of the Greeks.
Finally, Cyprus is regarded as a matter of national

prestige, and has touched off considerable popular interest
in Turkey.

Both the political leaders and the people take

the position that what had happened to Crete

— the

Ottoman

acceptance to relinquish that island on arguments of selfgovernment, followed by its annexation to Greece--must not be

repeated with Cyprus.

In Turkish eyes, the healthy Republic

of the twentieth century V7hich has replaced the deteriorating

Empire of the nineteenth could and should stand firm for its

legitimate causes.
The London-Zurich Agreements of 1960 terminated the

British rule over the island, rejected both Enosis and Taksi m
as viable alternatives, and agreed on independence as a solu-

tion acceptable to each party concerned.

The relations of the

new Cyprus Republic with Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey,

were arranged by three treaties, while the Constitution of the
same year regulated the legal framework within which the two

communities of Cyprus would coexist.
In the first treaty, the Treaty Concerning the Establish-

Briment of the Republic of Cyprus, the three states of Great
of
tain, Greece, and Turkey sanctioned the independence
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Cyprus exclusing the two base areas remaining
under British
sovereignty. The parties, along with Cyprus,
agreed to
"consult and cooperate in the common defense of
Cyprus. "^^
In the second treaty, the Treaty of Guarantee,
Cyprus

agreed to maintain respect for its constitution,
and "not to
participate, in whole or in part, in any political and
economic
union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares

prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of
the Is-

land." 6 2

Greece, Turkey, and Britain, on their part, guaran-

teed the independence, territorial integrity and security of
Cyprus.

They also agreed to prohibit any activity promoting

either Enosis or Taksim

,

and in case of a breach of the Treaty

to consult and take the necessary measures to ensure the obser-

vance of the treaty.

Article IV provided specifically that

"In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possibl

each of the three guaranteeing Pov;ers reserves the right to
take actions v/ith the sole aim of re-establishing the state of

affairs created by the present Treaty."

During the v;orst

days of the intercommunal crises of 1963 and 1967, Turkey invoiced this article as the basis for its threats of interven-

tion, although it never exercised the option.
^•^Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic
of Cyprus, Turkish Yearbook 19G3 p. 202.
,

^^Ibid.

,

p.

299.

^-^Ibid.

,

p.

300.

j
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In the third treaty, Greece, Turkey,
and Cyprus

formed an alliance to resist any
aggressive attacks on the
latter.
The Treaty of Alliance set up a military
tripartite
headquarters on Cyprus to which Greece and
Turkey were to
assign 950 and 650 men, respectively. The
supreme political body of the alliance would be the
Committee of Ministers
consisting of the ministers of foreign affairs of
Cyprus,

Greece, and Turkey.

Incidentally, the tripartite headquar-

ters were to be responsible to this political committee.

The domestic political life, on the other hand,

regulated by the Cypriot

v/as

constitution in an intricate sys-

tem of checks and balances.

The Republic adopted a presi-

dential system of government with the executive power, over
all except communal affairs, resting in the hands of a

Greek president and Turkish vice-president.

The two states-

men were to be elected by their respective communities, and
to be aided by a council of ten ministers, seven of whom

would be Greek, with one of the three key positions of foreign
affairs, defense, and security going to the Turks.

Con-

cerning decisions in these three areas, the president and
the vice-president would have separately or jointly the

right of veto.
The legislature, the House of Representatives, was to

have a membership of 70 percent Greeks and 30 percent Turks,

with a Greek president and a Turkish vice-president.

In

matters relating to the electoral law, the municipalities.
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itaxes or duties,

separate majorities were required from
both

(Communal members

addition to the legislature, there were
to be
separate and elected "Communal Chambers"
to administer
religious, educational, cultural affairs,
questions of personal status and communal activities, as
well as the financing of such matters. In addition, there
were to be
;In

separate Greek and Turkish municipalities in the five
tovms
of the island.
The courts also

v;ere

based on a bi-communal basis

with mixed courts ruling only over cases when parties to the
plispute belonged to different communities.

The constitution

also set up a Supreme Constitutional Court to hear cases con-

gerning contested legislation.
.

A neutral judge who would

not be from Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, or Britain would preside,

flanked by one Greek and one Turkish judge.

h seventy-thirty ratio between Greeks and Turks

to

v;as

be applied in the staffing of the civil service, the police,

and gendarmarie.

Kovjever, the army would consist of GO per-

cent Greeks and 40 percent Turks,
Both

Greel'is

and Turkish were the official languages,

and each community could celebrate their respective national

holidays
Thus, duality

v/as

the conceptual basis of the constitu-

tion reflecting the fact that on Cyprus there are two dif

-

82

feront communities existing with each other.

It was recog-

nized that the new state was not a nation-state,
since there
was no Cypriot nation. The Turkish side
relied on the

constitution to almost legislate equity into every phase
of
political life, indicating a lack of trust in the

intentions

Pf the Greek side.

If the constitutional provisions pro-

vided a system of checks on the power of the majority,
then the multilateral treaties gave Turkey the right to

intervene in the island if the events were developing in a

direction contrary to that established by the three treaties
and the constitution.

The 650 men Turkish contingent was

a further symbolic indicator of the military interest Turkey

had for Cyprus.

Most importantly, as one of the three

guarantors, the legality of the Turkish claims

v/ere

recog-

nized to be on the same level as those of Greece and Great
Britain.

The treaties gave Greece the same rights, and by

restoring the previous cooperative friendship she had enjoyed

with Turkey, strengthened her security.

The Cypriot

community acquired the right to administer the island

Greek
\;ith

the stipulation to respect the Turkish community's rights.,
Arid

finally, Britain secured

demands on the island.

tv/o

base areas which met her
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Highlights of the Conflict 1963 "19f^7

best interests of the independent republic
required
a healthy dose of good will and
intentions in order
rThe

to apply

the comprehensive and perhaps cuml^ersome
constitution.

Inonu had recognized, as early as 1959, the
distance between
legality and reality in Cyprus v^hen, as the leader
of
the

opposition, he criticized the London-Zurich Agreements
by a
prophetic analysis of the treaties:
confronting
.

.

m

an Enosis movement, it is not very likely that
Greece v/ill

be siding with us.

England is not bound by a definite commit-

ment for intervention.

Even if she admits a violation of

the constitution and the need to intervene, it is up to

ber to judge whether or not to participate in a military

intervention for this purpose.

If England acts this way,

the intervention will be agreed upon mutually, as stated in
the Treaty of Guarantee, but it will not be carried in

mutual cooperation.

In that case, Turkey will have to move

alone against the violation of its cause.

Besides, it should

npt be forgotten that at that time the violator of the Treaty,
the Republic of Cyprus, v/ill be a member of the United

Nations.

The conflict is a matter of shared concern for the

World Organization and specifically for the Security Council.
In that situation, if Turkey achieves the capability to in-

tervene by exercising its option sv/iftly, she will succeed by
a legitimate fait accompli

.

that the conditions are and

However, it cannot he claimed
v/ill

always be amenable for a
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fast military intervention on
our side.

Even though this

Treaty seems to eliminate an
extra-constitutional attempt
for Enosis, in reality it has
not done so. On tlie other
hand, the thesis of Taksim has
been eliminated
5^_facto.

,M
.

de jure and

j^egrettably, the constitutional order
was

challenged at every turn, and within
a matter of four years,
the turn of events dreaded by Inonu
had materialized.
The specific issues of friction were
the separate municipalities, the 30 percent Turlcish participation
in the

civil service, the veto right of the Turkish
vice-president,
and the establishment of the Cypriot army.
The Greek side

claimed that the provisions regulating such matters

v;ere

in applicable v;hile the Turks insisted that the
constitution,

having being drafted voluntarily by the
be implemented.

tv;o

sides, had to

In essence, the difficulties were simply

a manifestation of the entirely different orientations of the
tv7o

communities toward the constitution and the status of

independence as
that it upheld.

Greek Cypriot

v/ell as the

This status

v/as

not the desired aim of the

leadership's 1955-1958 EOKA struggle; instead,

they had consented to it as

realized that uniting Cyprus
immediately.

partnership of the communities

a

tactical move when they had
v/ith

Greece could not be achieved

For them, the constitutional order was meant to

be challenged and molded from the "two communities v;ith equal
64

Esmer et al., O laylarla Pis Politika

,

p.

397.
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rights" to a "majority-minority" basis, leaving
the Cypriot
Greeks unhindered in the pursuit of Enosis
The Turkish
Cypriot leadership felt handicapped from the
beginning
.

realizing that independence was to be "used for the
same end
which it purported to have prohibited as a sine qua
non

of peaceful cooperation betv/een the two communities."^^

Toward the end of 1963, Markarios submitted to the

Turkish vice-president and the guarantor states a memorandum
listing thirteen proposals for amending the constitution.
The veto pov/er of the vice-president, and the separate

majorities required in the legislature for adopting laws and
amendments in the key areas of taxes, municipalities, and
the electoral laws v/ere to be abolished.

The municipalities,

the courts, and the army v/ere to be reorganized on a unitary

basis.

The civil servants v/ere to be recruited on a 80-20

percent ratio.

Clearly, the thirteen amendments represented

an open bid to abrogate the rights of the Turkish community.

The leaders of both Turkey and the Cypriot

Turks promptly

and strongly rejected them.

Fighting started within days leading swiftly into
savage massacre of Turks on Christmas of 1963.

a

This pattern

^^Rauf Denktas, "The Cyprus Problem," Foreign Policy
(March 1971)

,

p.

"

96.

^^An emotional but illviminating first-hand account of
the violence on the island is supplied by Scott nibbons, a
British journalist living in Cyprus in Peace VJithout Honor
ADA Publishing House, 1969).
(Ankara:
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was continued over the next two years.

Makarios

v/ere

The intentions of

clarified when he announced in January
1964,

without prior consultations and unilaterally,
the abrogation
of the London-Zurich Treaties.
The concerned governments
came together once again in London, but
the diametrically

opposed views of the Turkish and Greek sides failed
to produce an understanding. A second major Greek
offensive on
Cyprus against the Turks

v.'as

launched the next month

prompting Ankara to threaten to land its forces in Cyprus.
In March 1964, a United Nations force was established
and

sent to the island.

However, its presence stopped neither

the violence nor the economic blockade the Greeks had newly

imposed on the Turks who by now had withdrawn to a number
of enclaves on the island.

Having been deterred by the

United States from intervening in Cyprus, the Turkish

government found itself in the frustrating position of being
unable to influence the Greek Cypriots directly.

Ankara

had to rely on putting diplomatic pressure on Greece to keep

Makarios in line.

Another device

harassing the Greeks in Istanbul.

v;as

to retaliate by

Turkey terminated a

previous agreement and started to expel the Greek citizens

while intimidating those Greeks

v/ith

Turkish citizenship.

However, after another particularly bloody Greek attack on
the Turks of Kokina, Turkish jets bombed Greek military tar-

gets in a limited but effective mission.

several mediation efforts

v;ere

In 1965, after

undertaken by the United Nations
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and the United States an uneasy quiet marred
by occasional
fighting settled on Cyy^rus.

Makarios had a knack for shrov7d timing, by having
the
first wave of violence in 1963 coincide with
weak governments
in Greece and Turkey, both of which were beset
by domestic
problems.

Similarly, when violence flared up for

a

second

time in 1967, a military junta had assuraed povrer
in Athens,
In November, the Creeks inflicted heav^/ casualties
in a

Turkish village in Cyprus.

Turkey issued an ultimatum to

Greece accompanied by the full mol^ilization of her forces.
This time, Greece and Makarios gave in.^*^

army composed of Greek regulars
land.

v;as

The illegal

v/ithdrawn from the is-

The economic blockade was terminated.

Turks, who since December 1963,

3iad

The Cypriot

suffered immensely in

their enclaves, announced the formation of a provisional

Turkish Administration with the aim of managing community
affairs.
tlie

They had

nov;

achieved a geographical division of

island.

Intercommunal negotiations started in April 1968,
and by September 1970 the fourth round

liad

been resumed.

The Turkish viev/s had evolved toward a Cyprus federated

state v/ith the central government in charge of foreign policy

defense, and economics, and the
^"^The

tv/o

communities enjoying

Turkish army is stronger than the Greek.

^^Thouqh there were no further explosions of fighting,
the talks have not produced a definitive settlement by 1974.
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complete autonomy.

This seems to be a reasonable
solution
since the "dual" system proposed by
the 1960 constitution
was inapplicable in Greek eyes,
and the "unitary" system
was not tolerated by the Turks.
VThether the Greek Cypriots
and Makarios have given up hopes for
annexation with Greece
is less clear.
However, they realize that it is
impossible
to forcefully impose an arrangement
on the Cypriot Turkish
community contrary to its and especially Turkey's
wishes.
Turkey, the United States and the Conflict

From the onset of the violence on Cyprus, Turkey
tried to have the dispute considered by the NATO
allies and

especially by the United States.

The peace-force proposals

of NATO were rejected by Makarios, mainly due to his
deter-

mination to avoid the alliance bargaining context of the organization, but it

\ias

the reluctance of her allies to exert

themselves toward a settlement of the dispute between two
of their members that disappointed Turkey.

Above all, however, it was the refusal of the United
States to come out in support of the Turkisli side that caused
the greatest disillusionment.

In the first phase of the

conflict, Turkey saw the necessity of intervening in the

island on four occasions in order to stop the indiscriminate

killing of the Cypriot

Turks.

It was prevented from doing

so mostly by the promises of the United States that the

United Nations would act decisively to alleviate the situation.
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In June 1964, Ankara warned for the fourth time
that it was

about to use its right of intervention under Article
IV of
the Treaty of Guarantee in order to restore
order
on the

island.

President Johnson dispatched a letter dated June

5,

1964 to the Turkish prine minister Inonu which not
only

halted this first actual preparation for intervention
but
also changed the very nature of the Turkish-American

friendship from then on.
The Johnson letter had

Turkey

v/as

tv;o

crucial points.

First,

reminded of the bilateral agreement regulating

American military assistance (see p. 26). Mr. Johnson said:
"Under Article IV of the Agreement with Turkey of July
1947, your government is required to obtain United States'

consent for the use of military assistance for purposes

other than those for \7hich such assistance was furnished.
I

.

.

must tell you in all candor that the United States cannot

agree to the use of any United States supplied military

equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present
circumstances."

60'

This coarse reminder of the less than

independent status of Turkey

v/as

accompanied by a remarkable

assertion concerning NATO reaction:

".

.

.a

military

intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct

involvement by the Soviet Union.

I

hope you will understand

^^Documents, The Institute of International Relations,
University of Ankara. The Turkish Yearbo ok of InJ^j^J^lfL^ipilg.!
Relations 1 966 (TVnkara: Ankara Universitesi Basimovi, 1969),
p. "l40".
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that your NATO allies have not had a chance to
consider

whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey
against
the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which
results
in

Soviet intervention without the full consent and
understanding of its NATO allies.

""^^

On June 14, prime minister Inonu informed the United

States that Turkey had postponed the decision to exercise
its right of unilateral action in Cyprus, no doubt a painful admission of v^eakness.

After reviewing Turkish and

American attitudes in the conflict, he discussed NATO:
"Our understanding is that the North Atlantic Treaty imposes

upon all member states the obligation to come forthwith to
the assistance of any member victim of an aggression.

The

only point left to the discretion of the member states is
the nature and the scale of this assistance.

If NATO members

should start discussing the right or wrong of the situation
of their fellov; -member victim of a Soviet aggression,
v;hether this aggression was provoked or not and if the deci-

sion on whether they have an obligation to assist this mem±)er

should be made to depend on the issue of such a discussion,
the very foundations of the Alliance would be shaken and,
it would lose its meaning.

An obligation of assistance, if

it is to carry any weight, should come into being iirjnediately

upon the occurence of aggression.
"^^Ibid.

,

pp.

139-140.

That is why. Article V of

91

the North Atlantic Treaty considers an
attack against one of
the member states as an attack against
them all, and makes
it imperative for them to assist the
party so attacked by

taking forthwith such action as they deem
"'^^
necessary
Inonu then elaborated on an understanding
of law, asking
the United States whether it "should not
have reminded
Greece, who repudiates treaties signed by
.

herself, of the

necessity to abide by the precept 'pacta sunt
servanda'

which is the fundamental rule of international law."'^^
It was difficult for Turks to comprehend why their

best friend would fail to support them in

a

major crisis

in which they judged themselves to be legally right.

They

realized the delicacy of the situation for the United
States since both Turkey and Greece were NATO mem.bers

.

Yet,

preventing Turkey from using her treaty-given right while
taking no measure against Greece or Makarios to bring about
a definite change on the island was interpreted by the

political parties, the leadership,

press, and the public

tlie

as an Tunerican endorsement of Enosi s

Professor Armaoglu theorisjes that the behavior of the

United States had been based on a mistaken assessment of the
relative stability of Greece and Turkey; that the church and
the monarchy were viewed as the pillars of stability in Greece

'^'"Vali,

Turkish Straits and NATO

^^Ibid., p. 317.

,

pp.

319-320.
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v/hile the 1960 coup in Turkey was
taken to indicate a pre-

carious situation.

By 1965, however, the general elections

put a strong majority government in office
in Ankara whereas
civilian rule was interrupted in Greece by a
military
coup

in 1967."^^

At this point, it is useful to note that after
Cyprus

became an independent state, Makarios adopted neutrality
as the foreign policy direction, and carefully
cultivated

relations with the non-aligned countries,

rioreover,

Cyprus had a well-organized communist party,

AICEL,

whose

prospects looked much better within an independent Cyprus
than v.dthin a Cyprus annexed to Greece.

Given, further, the

interest Moscov; exhibited toward maintaining the independence
of Cyprus, it is safe to assume that the United States

regarded Enosi s as a means of perpetuating the pro-West,

democratic character of the strategically located island.
In 1964, shortly after the exchange of letters, the

United States arranged a meeting betv/een the disputants in
Geneva, v/here Secretary of State Dean Jvcheson submitted a
plcin

proposing En osis

which would become

a

,

except for the northeast peninsula

Turkish-owned military base on Cyprus,

and the cession of a tiny Greek island to Turkey along the

Fahir Armaoglu, "Turkey and the United States: A
New Alliance," The Institute of International Relations,
University of Ankara, The Turkish Yoarhook of International
Relations 1965 (Ankara; Ankara Universitesi Basimevi, 1968),
p.

9.
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Turkish southv/e stern coast.

Turkey showed a willingness to

accept the plan as a basis for negotiations but Makarios

rejected the plan because of its recognition of the Turkish
demand for partition, and it was dropped.
The next year, the United Nations General Assembly

voted on the Cyprus issue.

By this tirae the United States

had realized the extent of Ankara's indignation over Johnson's
letter.

The dashed hopes of Turkey had prompted the govern-

ment to mend its fences with the Soviet Union.

Consequently,

the United States voted v/ith Turkey against the 1965 resolu-

tion v/hich emphasized the inviability of

tlie

independence

and territorial integrity of Cyprus, seemingly rebuking
the Turkish government's emphasis of the present force of
the 1960 London-Zurich Treaties.
By the time the second wave of violence broke out on

the island in 1967, the United States had reassessed the

situation.

It realized that Turkey could not be asked to

stop her plans for establishing a beachhead on the island a

second time.

Cyrus Vance worked feverishly as the special

United States envoy to quell the hot tempers.

Greece was

reminded that she would undoubtedly be the loser in any
two-sided confrontation with Turkey.

This time, Greece and

Makarios gave in, and met the demands of the Turkish ultimaGreek army
tum which called for the removal of the illegal
leader,
and the recall of general Grivas, the terrorist

from Cyprus.

howDue to the strong objections of Makarios,
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ever, the National Guard was not
dismantled.
Thus, the Cyprus crisis had a profound
impact on
Turkish-jv^aerican relations.

the United States had been

The special relationship with
tlie

basic pillar of Turkey's

foreign policy after the second World
War.

Turks had never

really analyzed the nature and limits
of this friendship
critically.

Yet in the first major crisis of foreign

policy that the Turks faced since the difficult
days of the
Soviet threats in 1945-46, the close friend failed
to

deliver.

As if this was not enough of a shock, Turkey was

told by the United States that the collective security
system she belonged to would not respond if she

by the prime enemy.

v/ere

attacked

The repercussions of this jolt were to

have great significance in the next few years for Turkish-

American relations, and Turkish foreign policy in general.
More immediately, Ankara turned its attention to the dormant
ties with the northern neighbor.

Turkey, the Soviet Union and the Confl ict

Ever since the foundation of the Cypriot

RepuJ^lic in

1960, the Soviet Union had been a sympathizer of the deter-

mination of Makarios to establish a policy of non-alignment
for Cyprus.

After the outbreak of violence in December

1963, the Soviets regarded Turkish jet flights and threats of

intervention as a prelude to a possible NATO plan to bring
the island under Turkish protection.

During this period.
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the Soviets repeatedly informed
Turkey and its western all les
that a Turkish intervention will be
regarded as an -invasi on"
of the island, and that the Soviets
could not remain indifferent to such an occurence in the
Mediterranean. In fact,
the Soviets announced that a military
aid agreement had

been signed between Moscow and Cyprus in
SeptemJ^er 1964
and
Russian arms had started to reach the Cypriot
Greeks via
Egypt.
,

Turkish-Soviet relations had shown a slight improvement
after the 1960 revolution in Turkey, but the Turks
decided
to approach the Soviets only after the arrival of the
American

President's letter in June 1964.

The Turkish foreign mini-

ster made a trip to Moscow four months later.

The two sides

agreed to expand commercial and cultural contacts, but more
importantly the communique referred to the necessity for
"respect to the undertakings born from treaties," and "adherence to the fundamental human rights."'^'*
it mentioned the existence of

their legal rights."
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"tv7o

Moscov.-

national communities and

Moscow evidently prized the prospect

of jjTiproved relations with Turkey.

after the

On the Cyprus issue,

On the other hand, soon

visit, Turkey "realized" a loss of interest

in the current project of NATO to establish a multilateral

The Turco-Soviet Communique of November 6, 1964,
The Institute of International Relations, University of
Ank ar a The T urkish Yearboo k of International Rela tions 1964
(Ankara:
Ankara Basimevi, "196 6") pT 170
,

,

75

Ibid.
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force in the Mediterranean

(seep. 57).

The foreign mini-

ster reminded the press that the
question was a source of
friction betv/een the big pov/ers such as
the United States,
Britain, and France, and stated:
"Let these big powers settle
their differences of view first, then we
will decide whether
or not to join the MLF."^^ ^^.^^ rj,^^^^^
formally declined
to participate in the force, a State
Department spokesman

called it a "psychological loss for the

VJest."^"^

More exchanges between Soviet and Turkish leaders

followed in 1965.

In January, a delegation of the Supreme

Soviet paid a visit to Ankara.

This

follov;ed in May by

V7as

the visit of foreign minister Gromyko.

Three months later,

Turkish prime and foreign ministers returned the call.

In

each case, the communiques issued referred to the "rights
of the

communities" on the island, and a "federal" solu-

tv7o

tion to the problem was endorsed by the Soviet foreign

minister.

To its credit, by taking the initiative, Turkish

diplomacy had brought about a favorable change in

*Ioscov;'s

policy toward Cyprus within a year.
Turk ey and Cyprus in the United Nati ons

Turkish diplomacy was not as successful in influencing
the outcome

:he

c,'

United NationL'

.

Cyprus debates v/ithin the foruias of the

Following the outbreak of violence on the

Chronology, Turkish Yearbook 1964
77

,

n.

2

45.

Chronology, Turkish Yearbook 1965, p. 221.
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island in 1963, the Turkish government
had sought to have the
dispute considered within the allied and
regional context of
NATO.
However, the Greek Cypriots were determined
to place
the issue within the confines of the
world organization where
they hoped to find considerable support
for their position.

Within days after the first massacre of the
Cypriot Turks
on Decenloer 1963, the Cypriot government
asked the Security

Council to intervene in the matter.
The Cypriot government representing the Greek inhabi-

tants, and the Turkish government representing the island-

Turks both presented several legal arguments in support
of
their respective cases.

The Greek Cypriots aimed to under-

mine the validity of the 1960 Agreements, but more importantly,
they sought to have the Security Council take a stance

against the treaties.

In three basic arguments, the legality

of the treaties, the legality of the relationship between the

treaties and the United Nations Charter, and finally, the
legality of the relationship between the treaties and inter-

national

lavy?

were challenged.

According to the riakarios government, the legality of
the constitution and the treaties it incorporated v/ere to be

contested because
people;

b)

a)

they were "foisted" on the Cypriot

they were "inequitable and unequal"; and

c)

the.

articles stipulating the intervention of third-party states

were incompatible
Hence

,

vvith

Cypriot "sovereignty" and "independence".

the constitution and the treaties v/ere to be con-

sidered void on each account.

Although it is true that the representatives
of the
two communities joined the drafting of
the Zurich-London
Agreements actively only in the last stages,
this writer
feels that they certainly were not "coerced='
into signing
the treaties. Moreover, in drafting the
constitution

they

fully participated in the year- long work of
the joint commission. Students of international law indicate
the idea

that international treaties are not rendered void by
reason
of coercion.
They note that v/hile the 19 60 settlement

followed a period of violence, it

v/as

not obtained by force.

Likewise, they dismiss as legally invalid the suggestions

that "unequal" treaties are ipso facto void and that "coercion" is evident v;hen parties must conclude agreements from

unequal bargaining positions
vention, they

cedure

v;as

v/ere a

"^^
.

As to the articles of inter

condition of independence.

Such a pro-

not illegal although politically a hindrance to

the Makarios government.
On a different level, the Greek Cypriots attempted to

discredit the 1960 Agreements by charging

conflict

v/ith
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article

tliat

these v;ere in

2:4 in the Charter of the United

Linda Miller, Cyprus: The Lav; and Politics of
Civi l Strife Occasional Papers in International Affairs,
Center for International Affairs,
Numi^er 19 (Cambridge:
Harvard University, 1968), p. 15.
,

79

Ibid.

99

Nations prohibiting the threat or use of
force and Article
2:7 stipulating domestic jurisdiction.
The argument

was that

since Cyprus, as a member of the United
Nations, enjoys
"equal rights of full independence and
sovereignty.
.

prescribed by the Charter— including
of self-determination,

,

.

as

of course, the right

the three guarantor states, in

voting to admit the Cyprus Republic as a member of the

United Nations, have abdicated any claim to enforce the
1960 treaties.

Contrary to such assertions, the Charter

neither presumes the automatic invalidation of treaties
signed betv;een states before they join the United Nations,
nor does it "prescribe"

tlie

Finally, the Cypriot

"right of self-determination."

government alleged that the

right of intervention given to Turkey is not only in conflict

with the Charter which prohibits the threat or use of force,
but also with "peremptory norms of international

lav;."

Des-

pite much maneuvering by the Greek Cypriot representatives,
the Security Council has repeatedly refused to pass judgment

on the validity of the treaties in question.
The Turkish representatives, on the other hand, empha-

sized the fact that without the role of Turkey, Cyprus could

not have gained independence from Britain in the first place.

Secondly they pointed out that the treaties were not open to
^^Letter of Zenon Rossides, foreign minister of
Cyprus, New York Times, 26 June 1964.
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unilateral abrogation.

Furthermore, the Turks had no doubts

that the independence of Cyprus and the Treaties guaranteeing this independence constituted a solution which was in

conformity with the right of self-determination, with

principles of the United Nations Charter, and

thie

v;ith the

need

to safeguard the friendship and cooperation between Turkey

and Greece." 81
treaties

v/ere

Rejecting the Greek contention that the
"forced upon" the Cypriots

,

the Turks further

disagreed with Makarios on the interpretation of the
Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee (see page

79).

The Article states that in case of a breach of the Treaty of

Guarantee if concerted action among Greece, Turkey, and the

United Kingdom proves impossible, then each of the three
states v7ould have "the right to take action" in order to

restore the provisions set forth in the J^.greements

Accord-

.

ing to Makarios, "action" signified only nonforceful measures.

Referring to the stationing of Greek, British, and Turkish
contingents on the island as allowed under the treaties, however, the Turks maintained that the three states had in mind
the possible use of some kind of force, and that limited uses
of force would not be inconsistent v/ith the Charter of the

United Nations.

Furthermore, the Turkish government insis-

tently accused the Greek Cypriots of having failed to imple-

^^Information Office, Tur kish Views on the R eport
ilodiatbr on Cyprus (V/ashington D.C.
QjJtll^.JjlL^"^g5LiL^-^^ Q"^
Turkish Embassy, 1965), p. 2.
,

:
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ment the constitution; and of having
perpetrated calculated
and provocative policies of oppression and
segregation.

It

also emphasized the anti-constitutional
character of the
thirteen amendments proposed by Makarios in so
far as

these aimed at changing the bases of the status
of affairs

established by the 1960 treaties.
alterations

v/ere

Indeed, such major

specifically prohibited by Article 182

of the Cypriot constitution.
The deliberations in the Security Council had mixed

results for the two protagonists.

Of the numerous resolutions

passed by the Council betv/een 19G4 and 1970

,

tical significance for the parties concerned.

tv/o

had poli-

The rest

called for routine extensions of period for the United

Nations Peace-keeping Force stationed in Cyprus.
The resolution of

4

March 1964 called upon the mem-

bers to refrain from any action or threat of action likely
to worsen the situation in the "sovereign" Republic of

Cyprus.

The reference to article two of the Charter v;hich

prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state seemed to
have been directed against Turkey.

The government of

Cyprus was asked to take the necessary measures to stop violence and bloodshed.

The resolution also recomjnended

tlie

creation of a United Nations Peace-keeping Force, and the
82
appointment of a mediator.
^

^Document, Tu rkish Yearbook 1964

,

pp.

162-163

102

The second resolution of importance

canie

inimediately

after the Turkish jots bombed Greol: military
targets on the
island in order to halt the systematic
extermination of
the Kokina village Turks.
The Security Council urgently
appealed to the government of Turkey on August
9,

1964,

"to cease instantly the bombardment of and
the use of mili-

tary force of any kind against Cyprus, and to the
Government
of Cyprus to order the armed forces under its
control to

cease firing immediately."^^

Thus, the Council did not he-

sitate to take a strong stand against the use of limited
force by Turkey despite the fact that she enjoyed such a

right under a recognized international treaty.

"The Coun-

cil's 1964 debate revealed that the majority of states

regard the Turkish government's unilateral claims under

Article IV as in abeyance so long as the United Nations re-

mains seized of the Cyprus conflict. "^^

The Turkish govern-

ment found this attitude highly unsatisfactory since the
Council, v/hile insisting on the suspension of the interven-

tion article, was unable to

liave

Makarios halt the killing

in Cyprus

However, the legal basis of the Turkish case, the

principle of "pacta sunt servanda", was never questioned.

In

fact, by refusing to pass judgment on the 1960 treaties, the

^^Ibid.

,

p.

165.

^^'Miller, Cyprus

,

p.

19.
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Security Council frustrated the Cypriot government's
desire
to obtain a resolution declaring that Turkey had
no right to

use force under Article IV.

Such a resolution would have

bolstered the Cypriot renunciation of the Treaty of Guarantee.
Having failed to achieve a pro-Greek resolution from
the Security Council, the Cypriot government turned its

attention to the' General Assembly.

It

V7as

here that Makarios

so skillfully capitalized on prevailing political sentiments.

Ever since the upsurge of nationalism in the early sixties,
the newly independent states of Africa and other continents

had come to command the majority of the votes in the General Assembly.

Mostly, these were small states frequently

beset by minority problems.

In foreign policy, they had

joined the ranks of those pursuing

a

policy of neutrality,

and together were referred to as the non-aligned Third World

countries
It was this group that the Greek Cypriot representa-

tives had in mind when they announced their intention to

bring the dispute to the attention of the First Committee
of the General Asseml^ly during the 1965 session.

Prior

to the convening of the Assembly, the Cypriot government cir-

culated a memorandum called Declaration of Intention v;hereby
it promised to "(1) adopt a Code of Fundamental Rights to pro-

tect the minority;

(2)

permit the Turkish Cypriots to parti-

cipate in parliament on the basis of proportional representation;

(3)

authorize the minority to direct "the education.
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culture, religion (and) personal status"
of its members;
and (4) accept a United Nations
Commissioner to oversee the
protection of the minority's rights, for a
limited period. "^^
This conciliatory approach was coupled
with a persistent effort to harp on themes like
self-determination, and

non-interference.

According to the Cypriot delegation's

presentation before the First, or the Political Committee,
"The issue before the Committee was not whether
Cyprus should or should not be united or associate
with some other country but whether it v/as
entitled to its rights under the United Nations
Charter, whether interference in the internal
affairs of Cyprus should be tolerated and whether
Cyprus v;as an equal Member of the United Nations.
If Cyprus v/as made a second-class Member, that
might set a precedent for other States, the cause
of Cyprus v;as tlie cause of all small States in the
United Nations. "^^

Similarly, the London-Zurich Agreements

v/ere

referred to as

treaties established at the end of colonial rule using

coercion against the weaker party.
The Turkish side, on the other hand, could not rally

much political support for the "pacta sunt ser\^anda" argument.

A return to the status quo seemed to be unacceptable

not only to the members of

tlie

Third V7orld, but also to the

Soviet Union and the United States.

Despite the fact that

the international press coverage of the Cyprus conflict was

^^Ibid.

^
Tl

,

p.

20.

^^United Nations, General Assembly, 20th Session,
First Commit tee
of t he 1407th Meeting:
^:.J:^J?
Deccri}:)er

1965

,

p.

334.
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adequate in exposing the atrocities
being committed against
the island-Turks, despite also the
fact that
tlie

basis of the dispute gave Turkey

itself politically alienated.

a

legal

strong case, /mkara found

If this was partly due to the

skilled exploitation of the sympathies of the
Third World
by Makarios, it was also attributable, in
a larger sense,

to the general direction of Turkish foreign
policy.

Since

becoming an ally of the West in the post-World War Two
years,
Turkey had consistently sided with the developed and

colonial

Western states at the expense of the interests of their
non-industrial colonies and the Middle Eastern Arabs.
(see p.

43).

In contrast, under the presidency of Makarios,

the governm.ent of Cyprus had carefully cultivated its ties with
the neutralists since the inception of Cyprus in 1960.

The Turks were too late in realizing that within the

confines of the General Assembly, they looked less appealing
than their adversary.

In October 1964, however, an indication

of things to come at the United Nations emanated from the

Second Conference of Heads of State or Governments of Uon-

Aligned Countries in Cairo.

In a regular press conference

in Ankara, the spokesman of the foreign ministry indicated

that although

tv/o

Turkish ambassadors specially sent to

the summit were not admitted as official observers, they

were closely following the conference.

87

Furthermore, the

on

Chronology, Turkish Yearbook 1964, p. 236.
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communique issued at its close mentioned
the "unrestricted
and unfettered sovereignty and independence"
of Cyprus.

Premier Inonu correctly interpreted this
as favoring Makarios
and Greece over Turkey in the Cyprus
issue. A number of
goodwill missions v/ere then dispatched to Africa,
but

evidently no immediate benefits accrued to Turkey in
regards
to the conflict.
In the meantime, at the United Nations, follov/ing the

deliberations, the Political Committee submitted a draft

resolution to the General Assembly .clearly supporting the

Cypriot Greeks, the resolution recalled the relevant parts
of the Cairo Declaration adopted by the Non-Aligned countries
in 1964, and the Ilarch 1965 report of the United Nations

mediator submitted to the Secretary-General.

The latter

had caused such extreme irritation in Turkey because of its
pro-Greek one-sidedness that Ankara considered the services
of Galo Plaza, the mediator, to have lost their effectiveness,

leading to his subsequent resignation.

Noting further, the

Declaration of Intention circulated by the Cypriot Greeks,
the resolution took cognizance "of the fact that the Republic

of Cyprus, as an equal

riem.ber

of the United Nations, is, in

accordance v/ith the Charter of the United Nations, entitled
to enjoy, and should enjoy, full sovereignty and complete

•

,.88
independence without any foreign intervention or interference,"

^^United Nations, General Assembly, 20th Session, Official Rec ords of the 1402nd Plenary Meeting 18 December 1965,
,

p.

C
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and went on to call upon "all States,
in conformity with
their obligations under the Charter, and
in particular,
Article 2, paragraphs 1 and 4, to respect
the sovereignty,
unity, independence and territorial
integrity of the Republic
of Cyprus, and to refrain from any intervention
directed
against it."^^

Resolution 2077 was adopted by the Assembly in
a vote
of forty-seven to five v-zith fifty-four
abstentions.
The

breakdovm of the vote
In favor

:

v;as

as follows:

Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Central

African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile,
Congo (Brazzaville)
Congo (Democratic
Republic of), Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus,
Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana,
,

Greece, Guinea, Haiti, India, Ivory
Coast, Jamaica, Kenya Lebanon, Liberia,
Malav;i, Mali, Nepal, Nigeria, Panama,
Paraguay, Rav.'anda, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
Syria, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda,
United Arab Republic, United Republic of
Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against

:

Albania, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, United
States.

AbstainjCngl

89lbid.

Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Byelorussian SSR, Canada, China, Colombia,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France,
Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuv/ait, Laos, Libya,
Luxembourg, Ilalaysia, riauritania, Ilexico,
Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal,
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Romania, Senegal, South Africa, Spain,
Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia,
Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Kingdom,
Venezuela. 9 0

Although the large number of states abstaining
from the
resolution indicated that Turkey's claims were not

defini-

tively rejected, the alienation she was confronted
with

caused sharp reaction in the country.

The Third World

states were clearly more concerned v.dth principles of
"inde-

pendence" and "sovereignty" than principles of international
law.

The new prime minister Demirel said the recommendation-

resolution was "contrary to justice, law, and international
agreements, and for this reason inapplicable."^^

Apart from causing a crisis of m.ajor proportions for
Turkey, the developments in Cyprus thus had produced first
the Johnson letter of 1964 informing Turkey that she could

neither use her American supplied v/eapons nor could rely on

NATO in case of a Soviet attack, and then an evidence of
non-support for Turkish diplomacy in the United Nations.
^Qibid.
^ -^Chronology

Turkish Yearbook 1965

,

p.

265.

CHAPTER V

RE-EXAMINATION OF FOREIGN POLICY 19 65-1970

A Reassessnent of Policy Toward the United States and
NATO
In itself a low point for Turkey, the Cyprus crisis

had several beneficial results for the country's foreign
policy.

First and foremost was the urgent need to reassess

the relations with the United States in light of the

startling letter from the American president.

That it took

a major blunder by the State Department to prompt the

Turkish leadership to initiate

a careful study,

years late, of its ties uith its main ally

v/as,

fifteen
naturally,

not to the credit of Turkish diplomacy.
If the pursuant grand debate

v;as

practically forced

upon the politicians, the intelligentsia, the press and the
public, the prevailing conditions in the country were

greatly conducive to accomodate such discussion.
the inauguration of the

nev;

Ever since

constitution after the May 1960

revolution, an era of unprecedented freedom of expression
and thought had been ushered in.

The revolution itself re-

presented a critique of the previous regime's domestic
policies.

Furthermore, the long-suppressed leftists were

•

staging a conback not only by influential publications, but
also by launching a Turkish Workers Party.

As a small but

articulate vocal group, the leftists contributed much to the
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public debates by their enthusiasm to question
and criticize established authority and institutions.
Indeed, a

"new order" based on ''left of center" politics
and a "planned
economy" becarae the rallying themes of intellectual
dis-

course.

Despite this atmosphere, the field of foreign policy

had not taken a central position v/ithin v/idespread
discussions until the eruption of violence in and the consequent

developments about Cyprus.
V7as

One notable exception, however,

the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

As had been pointed out

before, the Soviet Union's attempt to bring in the American

Jupiter missiles stationed in Turkey as another element in
possible bargaining

v/ith the

a

United States over the removal

of Soviet missiles from Cuba had marked the first time Turkish

leaders, civil and military,

v/ere

compelled to realize the

risks as well as the security involved in maintaining NATO
and American v;eapons and installations in the country.

Although the left had capitalized on the incident in emphasizing the dangers of belonging to a military bloc, the reputation of the United States had rem.ained, in general, mostly
untarnished.
The Cyprus conflict proved to be the turning point in

Turkish-American relations for

tliree

reasons:

a)

the United

States failed to nut its weight behind the Turkish side, and
in fact, subtly supported the thesis of Enosis

;

b)

Washington

denied Turkey the use of ?jnerican supplied v;eapons and equip-

Ill

ment (that is nearly all of Turkey's
military assets) in
a conflict directly affecting
Turkish national interests
but disapproved of by the United States?
and

c)

the United

States told Turkey that NATO, the cornerstone
on which
Turkey's defense rested, would not aid her
if she were
attacked by the Soviet Union, the official enemy

of the col-

lective security system, as a result of the Cyprus
conflict.
VThat

ensued amounted to a national outrage directed

against the United States.

Street demonstrations by univer-

sity students became a commonplace occurrence

grov/ing vio-

,

lent in protesting the visits of the U.S. Sixth Fleet.

foreign policy elite as

vrell as the

The

politicians in the par-

liament initiated a multi-sided debate that

v/as

fully

publicized by the press.
The intense interest in evaluating the nature of the

Turkish-American ties, and determining the limits of the
cooperation and its purposes

— both

of these directed the

course of the debate tov:ard the bilateral agreements signed

over the years between the two countries (see
pp. 28-29 ).

There

v;ere

Chapter Two

,

tremendous pressures on the legisla-

ture and the political parties to hold public hearings on a
series of secret executive agreements that had never been

ratified by the National Assembly.

Direct negotiations

betv;een Turkey and a reluctant United States began in 1967,

and

tv7o

years later the Cooperation Agreement concerning

Joint Defense

V7as

signed in Ankara.

The

nev; agreem>ent

tried
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to bring some sort of cohesion to the
fifty-four bilateral
agreements. Tribute V7as paid to the principle
of "mutual
respect for the sovereignty and the equal riahts"
of the

parties; it

recognized that the Turkish government

V7as

retained "property rights" of the base areas,
that it could
"inspect" these installations, and had to "approve"
of

their functions and aims.'^^

military and civilian personnel

was obliged to obey the Turkish law.

In practical terms,

the day to day operations of the bases,

novr

called the joint

defense installations, as well as the control over nuclear

weapons remained exclusively in American hands.

One major

base in southern Turkey did not acquire a "joint" character,
and is still under the exclusive control of the United

States Strategic Air Force.

Even in times of national

emergency, Turkish control was qualified.

According to

Article Fourteen, in such cases, the government had the
right to take "restrictive" measures

v;ith

can utilization of the bases in question.

regard to AmeriAs to the sensi-

tive issue of determining whether an American soldier commit-

ting a crime

v/as

on duty or not, the Turkish authorities now

acquired a voice in the investigations although not the right
92

Ikili An lasmalar in Icynzu [Inside
Agreements! ^fAnkara: Ekim
Bilateral
the
Information on
334-354.
Yayinevi, 1969)
pp.
Ilaydar Tunckanat,
,

^^However, the United States was not permitted to
utilize the facilities of this base in its October 1973
air lift to assist Israel against Egypt.
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4x)eOverrule the American military's claims of
jurisdiction.
;^.>*i^ther

negotiations over this and other bilateral agree-

ments are understood to have become a continual operation
•v;ithin the

Turkish ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1969.

^Together with the different facets of the Turkish-Amer-

ican relationship, the topic of NATO and Turkey's ties to this
(Organization received critical attention.

Due to its NATO

:membership, Turkey had felt its options significantly limited

as far as both decision-making and implementation processes

were concerned during the Cyprus crisis.
both Turkey and Greece

v/ere

First of all, since

members, the West found the

prospect of any clash between the two highly embarrassing,

^nd also very detrimental to the stability of its southeastern
flank.

Second, it

v/as

brought home to Turkey that she could

use the weapons given her through NATO only against the

Soviet Union and with United States approval.

In other V7ords,

-theoretically speaking, Turkey could not be militarily

engaged in minor clashes against its non-Soviet sea and
land borders.

Third, even if she were free to use her mili-

tary might, Turkey realized that she

V7as

of executing a beach-landing on Cyprus.

actually incapable
For one thing,

having 'assigned" fifteen out of her seventeen divisions to
the command of NATO, she first had to withdrav; some of its.

troops (this

v/as

duplicated by Greece).

For another, the

Mavy did not have any lightweight landing gear.
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These shortcomings raised previously iinconsidered

questions.

Did IIATO meet Turkish defense interests, or
was
common defense incompatible with national defense
reauire94
ments?
what were the aims of national defense? Was

security the only consideration, or did the
furtherance
of other national interests and the
socio-economic develop-

ment of the country have to be taken into account?

Was it

necessary to maintain an unproportionately large amy,
the
third largest in ITATO, while being the poorest country
within
that organization?

Debating the problems of national defense
an unprecedented phenomenon in Turkey.

v^as

truly

V7ith grov/ing avjare-

ness of the issues, doubts about the compatibility of NATO
and national defense interests increased.

These v:ere espe-

cially heightened when the guiding strategy of NATO, the
"massive retaliation," was abandoned in favor of the "flexible

response" principle.

The forraer had envisaged an immediate

and all-out response against any Soviet aggression.
its exposed frontier position,

for Turkish defense needs.

tJiis

Due to

was particularly suitable

The new strategy, on the other

hand, called for a coml^ination of conventional and nuclear

response escalating gradually through several echelons.

It

^'^Haluk Ulman, "Turk Ulusal Savunmasi Uzerine Dusunceler'
Si yasal
[Thoughts Concerning the Turkish National Defense]
Bilgiler Fakultesi Dergisi (V. xxl. No. 4), pp. 205-213.
,
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was obvious that an attack against the center of

would

llATO

not be countered either slowly or by the use of conventional
weapons.

It was equally obvious to the Turks that the

sparsely populated, mountainous and underdeveloped eastern
section of Anatolia would be a much more likely setting for
this kind of response.

That her territory might be traded

against time was a major source of anxiety.

Worse, accord-

ing to Western strategists, the flat lands of eastern Thrace

leading to Istanbul and the straits that adjoin the European

section of Turkey with the Anatolian mainland were considered
indefensible.

".

.

.in

the event of a major Soviet attack

NATO planners envisage the abandonment not only of large
areas in T-astern Anatolia (the Taurus-Zagros chains lie in the

southeast of Turkey)

,

but also of Thrace v;ith Istanbul and

the northern Straits areas as well; defense would be concen-

trated on the 7inatolian plateau and the Gallipoli Peninsula.
If that were the aim of its defense strategy, Turkey

9

vv^ould

have no need to continue with the enormous sacrifices she

makes as a NATO memi^er.

The question then arises as to whethe

her interests v/ould not be better served by severing her

military ties

v;ith IIATO.

ment can go along

vrith the

Needless to say, no Turkish governdefense priorities of UhTO men-

tioned above
Yet another dimension of anxiety concerning
^^Vali, Turkish Strai ts and M ATO, p. 89.
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116

the Turkish observation that in case of an
emergency, the

defense of the northern and southern outposts of

IJATO,

namely Norxvay and Turkey, would differ from that
of the
center, West Germany.

"Whereas the center v;ould be defen-

ded at its perimeter (forv/ard strategy)
(Turkey) v^ould be defended either "in

,

the southeast wing

depth"— that

is by

sacrificing Turkish real estate— or not at all."^^
These discrepancies betv/een the defense interests of

Turkey and NATO still are outstanding problems awaiting
solutions.

Turkish leaders also show a keen interest in the

Qutcome of the ^j^erican proposal for a mutual and balanced

reduction of forces in mid-Europe.

They are mindful of an

increase in Soviet forces around their own borders as a
possil^le consequence of such a reduction in Europe.

By convincing the Turks that

a)

their interests

differed from those of the United States, that

motives of the latter were suspect, and that

c)

b)

the

the military

alliance worked better for Washington than for 7mkara, the

Cyprus crisis has thus marked the beginning of a new stage
in Turkish diplomacy best characterized by its increased

consciousness of previously unsuspected problems of Turkey,

Norm alization o f Relations with the Soviet Union
In the fall of 1965, the conservative Justice Party

^^Ibid.

,

p.

121.
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won the elections by

a

majority.

Despite the known pro-

i^erican outlook of the party, the governp.ent
decided to
follow the new policy of rapprochement with
the Soviet
Union started a year earlier during the coalition
period.
In presenting his government's programme
to the National
AsseriDly on November 3, 1965, the new prime
minister Demirel

stated that to be tied to an alliance or ideology did not

prevent the development of relations with states belonging
to a different alliance or ideology, or with the neutral

states who

nov;

made up the majority. ^"^

The decision to alleviate Turkey's isolation caused

by the nonsupport of the United States in the Cyprus affair

had prompted Ankara to cultivate its long-neglected ties
V7ith Moscov/.

From 1965 on politicians of both countries

exchanged visits.

Soviet premier Kosygin's

Decer.±)er 1966

trip was returned by Demirel on September 1967.

Turkish foreign minister Caglayangil returned

a

In 1968,

previous

call by his counterpart, and a year later Turkish president

Sunay paid a visit to the Soviet Union.
issued after these exchanges

The communiques

v/ere sim.ilar in content.

Both

sides declared their devotion to the five principles of
Bandung, and general disarmament.

In addition, there would

be references to the situation in Cyprus, Vietncim, and the

Arab-Israeli conflict.
^"^Arar, Hukumet Programlari, p.

480.
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Political detente was reinforced by increased
economic
cooperation.

In 19 G7, an aid agreement was signed v/hich

initiated several major industrial projects in Turkey,
and
also provided the country v/ith a much needed outlet

for its

farm goods.
The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 19 6 8 caused
a public outrage in Turkey.

Officially, the normalization

of the relations continued, but the crushing of the Prague

spring certainly raised NATO's credibility in many Turkish

eyes

Turkey's application of the technical clauses of the

Montreux Convention regulating the use of the straits by
non-Turkish vessels has brought no major complaints from the
Soviet Union.

According to the Convention, Soviet v;arships

of any size are allowed through the straits provided that they

pass singly, escorted by not more than two destroyers, and
upon notification of the Turkish government eight to fifteen
days prior to passage.

On the other hand, non-Black Sea

states are limited in the tonnage of

v;ar

ships they can send

to, and the nur.iber of days the ships can remain in, the Black

Sea,

Consequently, one viev; is that an impetus for revising

the Ilontreux Convention would today

Union but from the United States.

com.o

not from the Soviet

^8

"Turk Dis Politikasina Yon Veren Etkenlcr 1923-19G8" [Factors Influencing Turkish Foreign
Policy, 1923-1968], Siyasal R ilgilcr Fahul tesi J>^i_si_
(V. xxiii, No. 3), pp. 264-266.
^^Ilaluk Ulman,
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The efforts to make the foreign
policy more flexible
and multilateral have also brought
improvements in Turkey's
relations with the European members of
the Socialist
Bloc.

From mid-1966 on, the diplomatic
traffic between Turkey and
Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Albania,

Hungary, and Poland

grew dramatically.

There were substantial developments in

trade, tourism, and cultural fields.

Although not to be

interpreted in the direction of the Balkan Entente
of the
1930s
Turkish diplomacy has definitely embarked
upon a

,

policy of active opening in this area after 1966.

New Emphasis on Turkish-Ara b Solidarity
The Cyprus crisis was also instrumental in exposing
the extent of the rift that had developed between Turkey

and many nations of the Moslem vjorld.

Despite common histori

cal, religious, and cultural ties, the Arab cooperation with

the Western states in the early twentieth century to rebel

against the rule of the Ottoman Sultan, the latter 's attempts
to suppress this movement, the Republican Turkey's total

break from its Islamic past, and the close identification of
post-1950 Turkish governments with the West which still maintained colonial ties with many Arab peoples were the major
factors in shaping Turkish-Arab attitudes.

Too, after the

initiation of the Trum.an Doctrine and the Marshall aid, Turke
99

...

Fahir Armaoglu, "Turk Dis Politikasmda Son Gelismelor" [Recent Developments in Turkish Foreign Policy]
Dis Politika (March 1971), p. 11.
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liad

moved swiftly to recognize Israel

v/ith

whom she had come

to enjoy mutually satisfactory trade relations by mid-sixties

The Arab displeasure with Turkish foreign policy was demon-

strated not only in the United Nations debates on Cyprus,

but also in the summit meetings of the non-aligned Third

World states.

Commenting on his countries relations with

Turkey, the Syrian foreign minister stated the problem

clearly in 1965:
relations

"Our attitude is related to Turkey's

v/ith Israel.

If Turkey insists on not giving

a sincere form to these relations, it v/ould be difficult
to establish desired relations

betv.'een

Turkey and Syria .''

"'"^'^

Similarly, the Tunisian president Dourguiba reminded Turkey,

during his visit in 1965

,

that "First of all, Tur]:ey should

try to understand the problems of the Arab countries and

consider

v/hat

problems, after having passed the phase of

colonialism, these countries have faced and are facing.

.

.

Turkey should put all her weight with the Arab countries and
thus make herself accepted.

""^^^

Having received the message, Ankara started to reshape
its Middle Eastern policy.
nev;

Tliis v;as

especially easy for the

government of Demirel which assuraed power in

19 65

l:)y

the support of the conservative and religious rural masses
100 Chronology, Turkish Yearbook 1965

^°^Ibid., p. 232.

,

p.

24 6.
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Of Anatolia.

Presenting the program of the government to

the National Asserably, Demirel announced that all

diplomatic representations have been mutually upgraded to

highest levels, and that the Arab countries could rely
on Turkey's understanding and support in their legitimate
cause.
The 1967 Arab-Israeli war provided Turkey v/ith its

first opportunity to display its new policy.

The Egyptian

paper El Ahram reported that Turkey will not let the United
States use her bases, and that she v7ould not mass troops
1

at the Syrian border."^

no

Prime minister Demirel called

for Israeli uithdrav;al and strongly denounced the forceful

acquisition of territory by Israel.
Reaction from the Arab world
able

,

v/as

immediate and favor-

accompanied by top level exchanges.

president pay

a visit,

To have their

in 1968 to Saudi Arabia including the

holy Mecca was a unique sight for the Turkish people.

The

niMuerous joint communiques recorded Turkey's opposition

to the use of force as a means of securing political advantages and territorial gains, and the use of such gains to

impose unilateral solutions.

Israel

v;as

from all the occupied Arab territories.
^^^Arar, Hukumet Programlari

,

p.

^^^New York Times, 31 May 1967.

asked to withdraw
In return, the

482.
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Arab states emphasized adherence to international coiranitments
and expressed hope for a just solution based upon the
legiti-

mate rights and interests of the two Cypriot communities.^^'*
Turkey, upon being invited, attended the 1968 Interna-

tional Islamic Conference in Rav/alpindi, and the 1969 Islamic

Summit in Morocco.

The latter presented Turkey with the

difficult choice of attending the Summit and having to take
a position satisfactory to both sides in a probable clash

between the progressive and the conservative elements, or
not to attend the Summit and risk offending

tlie

Arab and

other Moslem states.
Indeed, the Turkish-Arab detente was not without its

problems.

While eager to improve its standing, Turkey

refused to modify some of her policies v/hich she deemed to
Despite much pressuring from the

be in her interest.

United Arab Republic in the 1969 Islamic Summit, Turkey did
not adopt a more militant policy tov/ard Israel and sever

diplomatic relations.

Likewise, when the Economic Council

of the Arab League adopted a resolution recommending

tl-iat

Turkey replace Israel with Arab countries in her foreign
trade, foreign minister Caglayangil stated

tliat

his country

would be pleased to improve economic relations with Arab
^
countries
.
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,
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149,

151.

123

On another issue, Turkey indicated her concern for
the Israeli position on the status of Jerusalem and the

plight of the refugees, but

sav;

thsese as of interest to the

whole world, separated from political problems.

Ankara was

also determined to stay out of strictly inter-Arab conflicts

such as those involving the future of the Persian Gulf, or
the civil v;ar in Yemen.

Further, her secularist tradition

as well as the newly found flexibility in her foreign policy

made Turkey reluqtant to approve of plans seeking to

establish a coordinating organization among Islamic nations.
In 1968, a proposal by the president of Somali to set up an
Islaraic Union to examine the military and diplomatic aspects

of problems facing the Moslem world drew a cold response

from the Turkish foreign minister

v;ho

stated that no alli-

ance was necessary among the Moslem states.
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Similarly,

in the foreign ministerial conference of Islamic countries
in March 1970 Turkey declined to support an initiative

calling for a permanent secretariat for Islamic nations.
Outside of these differences, though, the Turkish

determination to be more considerate of Arab feeling was once
again demonstrated during the critical weeks of warfare
betV7een Jordan and the Palestinian guerillas.

The latter

were openly aided by Syria, but Turkey managed to support
l^''
Jordan without causing ill-feelings in Syria.

^^^

Ibid

^-^'^Omer

.

,

p.

147, p.

It was

150.

Kurkcuoglu, "Turkey's Middle East Policy",

Foreign Policy (June 1971),

p.

96.

•
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y^pprted that Turkey, along with Greece, Italy, and
Spain
fcad refused to allow American flights to
operate from

their

spii during the Jordanian crisis. "'"^^

mth
-Tianisia,

the Nortli African Arab states of Morocco, Algiers,

and Libya, Turkey enjoyed good relations.

How far

she had come in gaining the sympathies of the Arab
world

Kas shown at the September 1970 Summit of Non-Aligned
Nations.

Unlike the 1964 meeting in Cairo, this one not

pnly refused to endorse a pro-Greek recommendation pushed
hy Makarios, but his fait accompli of having the proposal
fit

least read before the adjournment of the meeting drew

wide protests from the Arabs.

Turkish diplomacy could take

fpll credit for achieving such results in a matter of six
years.

Modifications in Policy Toward Non-Aligned Stat e
The endorsement of the pro-Cypriot Greek resolution
in December 1965 by the General Assembly may be viewed as

an important turning point in Turkish attitudes tov/ard that

body and its main group of constituents, the Third World
states.

These states, a majority of which were formed out

of the continually shifting political lines within Africa,

not only sponsored the "independence" and "non-interference"

oriented resolution, but in so doing disregarded the implication of nonsupport for the "respect for international treaties
^^^New York Times,

1

December 1970.
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and human rights" position of Turkey.

Until this event, Turkish perceptions of the
United
Nations were marked by sympathetic identification
with the

principles of the Charter, and, at the same time,
a realistically low estimate of the political effectiveness
of the

organization.

Turkey had failed dismally in appreciating

the changes brought by the sixties:

the insecurity felt by

the newly independent entities, their resentment of
their

recent colonial rulers, their desire to find international
acceptance, and the importance of the General Assembly as a

world forum providing them with an opportunity to express
their opinions, and a vote equal in weight to anybody
else's.

By actively utilizing the mechanisms of this egali-

tarian political body, they had obliged the others to pay

closer attention to it.

In the process, the General Assembly

had become a genuine mirror of v/orld public opinion.
These changes as well as the gap in Turkey's perception
of them were manifested to her in the diplomatic isolation
the 1965 vote represented.

Twenty-eight African, seven

Asian, and nine Latin American countries had supported the

resolution
Resolved to recuperate from this alienated position,
Turkey decided to increase its presence in the capitols of
these countries, and also to pay closer attention to the
issues concerning them in the United Nations.

Denouncing
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colonialism and racism, the Demirel government of
1965
reaffirmed its allegiance to the United Nations
Charter and
the principles of the Bandung Conference, and
indicated
that Turkey should introduce its experiences and
thoughts
to these aspiring nations.

In

tlie

years to follow, there

significant increases in cultural, commercial and

v/ere

touristic exchanges between Turkey and the Arab world, but

only minor advances as far as the more distant African,
Asian, and Latin American states were concerned.

First of

all, the best diplomatic efforts of Turkey were spent on

Cyprus until 1968, and on the problems inherent in her
ties with the West after that.

Secondly, the financial

resources of the country could accommodate the burden of

increased representation abroad only up to a certain limit.
The foreign ministry tried to help the situation by accrediting one ambassador to more than one country.

was

tliG

A similar measure

visit of the ambassadors of thirteen African states

accredited to Cairo as official guests of the Turkish government.

Taking a more active role in the deliberations of the
heavy

United Nations, on the other hand, did not entail

a

financial drain on the resources of the country.

Her unique

position of being a memJDer of both the Western and the Asian
Groups afforded her a measure of added flexibility.
109

Arar, Hukumet Programlari, p.

4 82.
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Asian Group membership in turn enabled Turkey
to be a member
of the Afro-Asian Group, the largest and
most influential

in

the United Nations, although she was not a
member of the

original Group of 77 composed of the developing
countries,
and established after the Cairo Declaration of
July 1962
in relation with the First Development Decade
and the Con-

ference on Trade and Development

.

•^'^

The Committee in which Turkey was most active is the

Fourth or the Trusteeship Committee.

Also called the

Committee on Decolonization, it deals with the question of

Namibia (Southwest Africa)

,

the territories under Portuguese

administration, Southern Rhodesia, activities of foreign

economic and other interests impeding the implementation of
the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial

Countries and Peoples, educational and training progarms
for Southern Africa, the numerous non-self governing terri-

tories scattered around the globe.

Turkey had been

a co-

sponsor of the important Declaration on Decolonialization
in the 1960 session of the United Nations, and had complied

fully v/ith the economic sanctions brought by the Security

Council against the illegal regime of Southern Rhodesia.
More recently, since its inception in 1967, she has been an
active member of the Council for Namibia.

^^^Yuksel Soylemez, Foreign Policy of Turkey at the
U nited Nations 1966-1972 (Ankara: Ministry of Foreign
Affairs Press, 1973)
p. x.
,
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Since 1966, the Turkish vote on the issues relating
to the Fourth Committee's work has shown a definite pattern.
In 1966, Turkey cosponsored with other Afro-Asian delegations
a draft resolution

[A/L 483]

,

calling on the United Nations

to take over the mandate given to South Africa to administer
Southv/est Africa.

In 1968, she voted with the Third

World group in condemning governments with relations to
South Africa. ''^
Since 1962, problems of Angola, Mozambique and Ginea
Bissau, all territories under Portuguese administration, have

been discussed in the Fourth Committee.

Turkey supported

the freedom and independence of these peoples in principle,

but when the draft resolutions condemned the role of NATO
allies in encouraging Portugal, Turkey abstained in the 1966
and 1967 votes.

This was a middle of the road position

between the Third World and

a typical

grouping of the ex-

colonial countries of Europe and the United States.
In votes concerning the trust territories of Nauru,
Nev7

Guinea, the non-self -governing territory of Papau, the

decolonialization of French Somaliland, Ifni, the Spanish
Sahara, Equatorial Guinea, and the problem of apartheid in
Nations, General Assembly, 21st Session,
Official Records of the 1419th Plenary Meeting 27 September
1966, p. 22.
^•'•'-United

,

^'^United Nations, General Assembly, 23rd Session,
^
June
Offi cial Records of the 1671st Plenary leetjmcT, 12
r96"8, p7~T,
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Southern Rhodesia, the United Nations blocs have voted
in strikingly
consistent patterns. One example
suffices to make the point.
In the twenty-second session

(1967)

,

the resolution recom-

mended by the Fourth Committee [A/6
884] to denounce the
government of Southern Rhodesia, was

adopted by the General

Assembly by a vote of ninety-two to two
with eighteen abstentions.
Members of the Third World and Turkey made
up the

ninety-two favoring the resolution:

Portugal and South Africa

were against it, and Belgium, Canada, France,
Italy, Great
Britain, United States, Sweden, and Norway were
among the

eighteen that abstained. -^-^^
In the Arab-Israeli conflict, Turkey has repeatedly

denounced Israel and endorsed the November 22, 1967 resolution of the Security Council calling for the withdrav/al of

Israel from occupied Arab territories.

She has sponsored

the Jerusalem Resolution of May 1968 opposing the incorpora-

tion of the whole city of Jerusalem into Israel.

Except

for France and Greece, her votes on this issue differed

considerably from those of her other NATO allies. "''^^
Likevrise, with regards to the Vietnam war, Turkey has

repeatedly pleaded for an end to the suffering of these
peoples, and endorsed the 1954 Geneva Accords as a basis for
113

United Nations, General Assembly, 22nd Session,
Officia l Records of the 1594th Meeting: Fourth Committee
3

Noveml^er 1967
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,

p.

,

4.

Francis Beer, Integration and, Disintegration in
NATO (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1969), pp. 26-27.
.

.

.

.

.

.
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agreement.
On the other hand, Turkey has voted with

tlie

West in

rejecting Peking as the representative of China, in
maintaining United Nations troops in South Korea, and in
supporting measured toward general disarmament.
Recently, Ankara has sho\^m an interest in eocnomic and

social cooperation between the industrialized and developing
countries.

In the tv;enty-f if th session

(1970)

,

foreign

minister Caglayangil was critical of the rate of growth proposed in the international development strategy in relation

with the forthcoming inauguration of the Second Development
Decade.

At the same time he expressed concern about the

effects of progress on the balance of nature
In the same session

,

^"'"^
.

Turkey proposed the establishment

of a new machinery within the United Nations to rapidly

organize

assistance and materiel to countries stricken

natural disasters.

V7ith

According to the Turkish delegate, such

a central and computerized agency would not only be able to

deal with the crisis situations more efficiently in cutting

out duplicate and unusable aid, but also would avoid the

charges of propaganda involved in aid extended by some of the

industrialized countries to developing ones.

In the Third

Committee (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural problems), more
than fifty states joined the Turkish proposal, and it was a115

United Nations, General Assembly, 25th Session,
Official Records of the 18 4 9th Meeting 24 September 1970,
pp7"3>-55.
,
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dopted by the General Assembly.
The active participation of Turkey
in many ad-hoc
committees, sub-corronittees and drafting
committees, her
election to boards and councils have
helped her to establish
herself in the mainstream of the United
Nations politics.
The non-aligned countries' 1965
vote on Cyprus has induced
Turkey to change her image in the United
Nations from noncommittal aloofness to active participation.
Since
,

then,

she has become a steady supporter of
the Third World regardless of the stance taken by her Western
allies.
In turn,
this policy has helped to enhance her respectability.
116

Soylemez, Turkey at the United Nations
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
The preceding chapters demonstrated the
pattern of

change within Turkish foreign policy over a
period of twentyfive years. While the Cyprus crisis of the
mid-sixties,
in so far as it led to the Johnson letter

(informing Turkey

that she could neither utilize the v/eapons given her by
the

United States without American approval nor could count
upon NATO assistance in case of a Soviet attack) and the
General Assembly vote of 1965 (indicating the extent of
the alienation that confronted Turkey, was the external

factor immediately responsible for a change of course

within Turkey's foreign policy, the foregoing analysis
aimed to explain the underlying complex interaction betv/een
the domestic and foreign policy developments that led up

to the climatic events of Cyprus.

The domestic politics of Turkey has evolved from the
one party authoritarian regime of the first thirty years
of the Republic

(1920-1950), through the two-party

struggles of the fifties to the multi-party liberalism of
the sixties.

If it is possible to point to four events and

episodes as the most influential in shaping the political
culture of the country during the fifties and the sixties,
the first one would be the peaceful transfer of pox^er

,

in

133

1950, from the Republican Peoples Party to the
newly

formed Democratic Party as a result of the first
elections
ever held in the country. The Republican Party
had been

founded by Ataturk, and upon his death, Ismet Inonu,
the
much respected "pasha" and seasoned diplomat of
Ataturk's
cadre, who had then taken over the administration of
the
state, and the secretary-generalship of the party.

After

thirty years of non-competition, the party lost heavily in
1950 to the four-year old Democratic Party of Menderes.

Much to the astonishment and admiration of his countrymen,
Inonu did not resort to any measures to challenge the ter-

mination of his rule, and calmly assumed the leadership of
the opposition.

It was a valuable lesson in the procedures

of democracy; but more importantly, it signified an accep-

tance of the existence of viev; points different than those

pronounced by the official authorities, of their viability,
and of the rights of others to hold them.

Altogether, it

contrasted uniquely with the past political traditions of
the country.

However, lessons on democracy seemed to have been lost
on the Menderes regime.

After reelection in 1954, the Demo-

cratic Party government initiated a reign of oppression aimed
at smothering its main political opponent, the Republican

Peoples Party, and restricting the independence as well as
the

po\-7er

of such groups and institutions as the press, the

universities, the bureaucracy, and the National Assembly.
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The resulting polarization of the political
scene was only

worsened by the irresponsible determination of
Menderes to
exploit religion for partisan purposes by dangerously
com-

promising the secularist outlook of the country.

Moreover,

by the end of the fifties, the economy had
come to a standstill as a result of the unplanned and non-production
oriented

spending of Menderes, and the inflationary deficit financing
that sustained it.

This somber sight of a popular political

party making a brilliant start with promises of political
and economic liberalization, then becoming ruthless oppressors
and dragging the country to the brink of disaster was cer-

tainly an important episode in Turkish politics.

Another

dimension that should be immediately mentioned is the i\merican
role vis-a-vis the Menderes regime.

It must be borne in mind

that the Menderes regime not only enjoyed the political "pa-

tronage" of the United States, but it also was encouraged
to manage the economy according to the approved capitalistic

model.

V/hen that failed,

the government was bailed out by

huge loans from the American friend.

And yet the United

States kept silent as Menderes scrapped political freedoms.
This American refusal to use its enormous influence on the

Turkish Democratic Party leaders to restrain their political
and economic recklessness was one of the first germs of anti-

T^ericanism planted by the Americans themselves.
The third event carrying major political significance
v/as

the army revolution of May 1960

,

and the trials of the
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deposed political leaders.

The coup was aimed at arresting

the political polarization approaching civil strife,
and the

economic unrest.

The revolutionary officers took pains to

clarify that the movement was not seeking to affect changes

within Turkish foreign policy, and was not directed against
Turkey's allies,

\niile this was undoubtedly true,

it could

not have escaped- thoughtful observers that the United States

had approved and supported v>7holeheartedly the policies of
a regime whose entire leadership was now being held to

account for their previous deeds.

Thus, while not meant nor

perceived to do so by the Turks at the time, the coup,
nevertheless, contained an implicit critique of the Turkish-

American liasion.
With their revelations of abuses by and the human frailties of once powerful national figures, the trials provided

unusual drama in the flow of politics.

But more importantly,

millions witnessed a process in v;hich the political leadership of a decade was asked to justify the compatibility of

many of their decisions and non-decisions

v/ith the lav/ of

the land in particular, and v/ith the best interests of the

nation in general.

If the events of the 1950 elections

underlined the plurality of interests and views within

a

country, the 1960 revolution contained implicitly the con-

cept of accountability, and the norm of domestic interests
of the country.

The fourth major domestic development of the era in
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study, the constitution of 19G1 was a direct consequence
of
the revolution.

Determined to modify the system which allov^ed

the previous regime to exploit it for partisan
purposes,

the National Unity Committee, composed entirely of
revolu-

tionary officers, asked a group of respected scholars to

draft a constitution.

The new document introduced such

legal-political institutions and procedures as the upper
house (Senate)

,

the Constitutional Court, the State Planning

Organization, and an electoral system based on proportional

representation.

Possessing a pronouncedly liberal character,

it strengthened the fundamental rights of the individual and

incorporated the idea of the welfare state.

Apart from

bringing these needed changes, however, the constitution of
1961 is significant for two other reasons.

First, although

drafted by professors, essentially it embodied the aspirations of a revolutionary group of relatively lov;-ranking

young army officers, reflecting the spirit and direction of
progress they envisioned for their country.

Second, in fos-

tering a genuine atmosphere of freedom it generated an outburst of public and academic discussions, and
new publications.

A

nev;

a

torrent of

taste for the critical appraisal

of previously little considered issues, such as the means of

development best suited for Turkey, in its turn prepared the
ground for the concern for and the arguments about the foreign

policy of Turkey that were to be manifested in
years

a couple of
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Unlike the domestic developments which
evolved through
several phases, the foreign policy of Turkey
since the end
of the second World War has been
consistent in its cooperation with the West. The previous neutrality
had to be

abandoned due to the necessity of resisting
Soviet pressures
in the long-run.

In particular, Turkey sought to shelter

of the American military might in order
to counter the Soviet

threat.

If security and survival were the main
consideration

in determining Turkish interest in an alliance
with the

United States, equally important

v;as

the hope of securing

aid toward the economic development of the country.

The

United States and Europe, on the other hand, had their ovm

military and political interests in mind in extending aid to
Turkey in 1947, and in accepting her as a member of the Council of Europe in 1949

,

and of NATO in 1952.

Eager to secure

such assistance, Turkish leaders often neglected to examine

important aspects of this alliance

v/itli

such results as the

burden of maintaining an unusually large army, and the numerous cidvantages and privileges given to the United States in
a series of bilateral agreements.

Apart from the fact that not every consequence of
cooperation based on mutual needs

v/as

beneficial to Turkey,

there were other components of the Turkish-American collaboration that did not have their basis in Turkey's needs, and in
fact, v/ere clearly detrimental to Turkish interests.

By

agreeing to assume a leading position in the creation of
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CENTO in 1955, Turkey acquired the image of the
regional
spokesman for American and British interests in the
Middle
East.

This was only worsened when Turkey politically en-

dorsed, and militarily assisted the American intervention
in the domestic politics of Lebanon in 1958.

By the end

of the fifties, Turkey had won the enmity of the Arab
world

not because she had any contentions with them, but because
she had demonstrated an apalling unconcern for their pro-

blems and opinions vis-a-vis the Western states.
Turkey followed a similarly short-sighted policy
toward the non-aligned countries of the world.

For the sake

of the /American friendship, she again assumed an unnecessarily

active role in defense of the V7estern alliance.

Self-

righteous in the conviction that no state could stay neutral
in a bipolar world, she generally belittled those that v;ere

trying to pursue such a policy.
7.n

trying to seek alliances with the West to lessen

the disadvantages of their exposed location, Turkish leaders

did not hesitate to embark upon measures that were bound
to be irritating to the Soviets.

Providing the latter 's

main rival v/ith loosely restricted military privileges was
a provocative policy reflecting a lack of consideration for

the long-term interests of the state.

Fortunately for the

Turks, after 1953, the Soviet leadership initiated a peace

offensive which, in the case of Turkey, sought to reassure

Ankara that the Soviets had renounced their previous terri-
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torial claims.

Regrettably, due to dogmatic views that world

peace was indivisible, and that the security needs of
Turkey

were identical with, and could not be separated from
those of
NATO, Turkish politicians failed to take advantage of
the new

tone in Moscow.

During the 1960s

Turkish foreign policy underwent

considerable changes, but in the years before the Cyprus
crisis these were rather unpronounced as compared to the
later years.

Acting as a catalyst as far as its effects on
foreign policy are concerned, the Cyprus crisis arose as
a result of the breakdown of the political and administrative

system foreseen by the 1960 constitution of the island.

Never seriously applied, the complex network of checks
and balances designed to protect the rights of the Turkish

community

v;ere

officially challenged in a series of thirteen

proposals by the Greek Cypriot leader, Makarios

.

In no

time, the rapidly v/orsening political situation turned

into open and violent attacks against the Cypriot Turks who

were outnumbered five to one.

The intensity of fighting and

the losses suffered were highest in 19G4 and again in 1967.
The Turkish government in Ankara could not remain in-

different to the physical attrition of its compatriots in
this strategically located island.

On several occasions

between 1964 and 1967, Turkey considered a limited landing
operation on Cyprus.

She

v/as

prevented from doing so by the
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blunt reminder from the United States president that in
order to utilize her American-supplied v/eapons Turkey

needed to secure the approval of that country.

At the same

time, Turkey realized that she actually did not possess the

landing equipment her navy would have needed.

Thus, she was

completely frustrated in her attempt to influence the
situation in Cyprus by the interference of the United States.
The ensuing disillusionment v;ith regard to the 2\mericans were

only enhanced as the Cyprus question was discussed in the

United Nations.

There, Turkey realized that she did not

have the political support of a considerable majority of

nations mainly due to the past record of its excessively

pro-American foreign policy.
There were inklings of change in Turkey's foreign

policy before the Cyprus conflict.

Both

tiie

revolutionary

committee and the following coalition governments exhibited

interest in a cautious relaxation of frigidity toward the

Soviet Union.

The latter had renewed its offer of rapprocJie-

ment, and the two sides proceeded on the basis of complete

recognition of Turkey's existing international commitments.
A parliamentary delegation visited Moscow in 1963, and
despite the warm reception the Turks warned their hosts that
between
no immediate and important progress could be possible
the two states.

With the sudden outburst of the Cyprus

the letter
crisis, and the ensuing Turkish disappointment over

Turkish-Soviet
from the American president, the improvement of
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relations took a dramatic turn.

The foreign minister's

visit in 1964 brought forth a change in Moscow's proMakarios attitude, coupled

v/ith an

endorsement of the Turkish

emphasis on respect for the 1960 Cyprus treaties which not
only established the new state, but also devised a system

protective of the rights of the Turkish community on the
island and allov/ed Turkey, Greece, and Britain to intervene
in case of an abuse of the system.

Frequent and top-level contacts between the political
leadership of the two countries hastened the thaw.

In

return for the Soviet understanding of her position on
Cyprus, Turkey decided to v/ithdraw its support from the

NATO project establishing a multilateral force in the Mediterranean, and also moved closer to the Soviet stance in

regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Vietnam

vrar.

The political detente was reinforced by economic coop-

eration as an aid agreement initiated several industrial
investment projects by the Soviets, and provided for Turkish
The invasion of Czechoslo-

export of agricultural products.

vakia in 196 8 must have supplied

a

pessimistic note to the

constant search for the real motives of the Soviets; never-'
theless, the two countries had completely normalized their

relationship by the end of the decade.
Between 1960-1970, Turkish attitudes toward long-time
neutrals, newly independent non-bloc countries, and those
in
striving for independence also underwent a metamorphosis
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a similar pattern.

In the early sixties, this change

v/as

characterized by an enhanced avrareness of and identification

with the numerous problems of the developing nations.

Tur-

key sympathized with and assisted the Algerian nationalists,

but mostly, the new consciousness was reflected in verbal

official elaborations.

After the Cyprus episode, however, Ankara intensified
its efforts tov;ard the Third VJorld.

Although trade and

cultural exchanges between Turkey and some distant African
and Asian states increased, in this respect Turkey was

limited by its ovm financial restrictions.

Progress was

most dramatic in the case of the Middle Eastern and North

African Arab states.

Diplomatic representations were

mutually upgraded to highest levels along with presidential
and ministerial visits as Turkey adopted a decidedly pro-

Arab behavior in the 1967 war

v;ith Israel.

l#iile Turkey

was rewarded by the generous political support of the Arabs,
she stopped short of severing its political and mutually

beneficial commercial ties with Israel.

By the end of the

sixties, Turkey had become a friend of the Arabs, attending
the Islamic summits, and had acquired the Arab support in
the meetings of the non-aligned states.

All these changes in Turkish foreign policy were

reflected in the United Nations during the same period.

Just

as the general policy was lopsided in favor of the United

States and the West, the Turkish participation in the United
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Nations manifested an unncessarily excessive
concern for the
interests of her NATO allies and the United States.
Apart
from supporting the West on issues relating to
the inter-

bloc rivalry (disarmament, regulation of armaments,
Korea,
Greece, admission of new members), her vote consistently

favored the colonial, advanced West over the anti-colonial,

underdeveloped Asian, Arab, and African states in such issues
as the right of all peoples to self-determination,
the ques-

tion of the French North African protectorates, race conflict
in the Union of South Africa, and Portuguese colonial

enclaves in the Indian subcontinent.
In the 1965 vote of the General Assembly over the

Cyprus conflict, Turkey realized that her previous attitudes
toward the Third World had systematically alienated her

from this influential group in the United Nations.

Resolved

to redress this diplomatic isolation, and also taking advan-

tage of her unique position of being a member of both the

Western and the Asian Groups, Turkey assumed an active role
in the general deliberations of the Trusteeship Committee,

and the Council for Southwest Africa.

In contrast to the

Western states, including almost all of her NATO allies,
V7hich either voted against or abstained from resolutions

relating to the territories under Portuguese administration,
apartheid in Rhodesia, censoring of South Africa, and the
status of the numerous non-self-governing territories

scattered around the globe, Turkey systematically cast her
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vote with the Third World countries.

Thus, by 1970, Turkey

had definitely left behind her previous noncommital aloofness,
and managed to locate herself in the mainstream of the United

Nations politics.
To sum up, we can conclude that in the years covering

her alliance with the West, Turkish foreign policy suffered

from several crucial fallacies and omissions.

First, despite

the legacy of the Ottoman political traditions, and the

excellent example of neutrality under Ataturk, Turkey com-

mitted the cardinal error of relying exclusively on one
state, the United States, in its post-World War II policy.

Second, she failed to evaluate the interests of the United

States in this partnership, and used poor

judgment in

balancing what its own best interests required with
how much to be given to the United States.

v;hat

and

Third, she

repeated the same mistakes in relation to her ties with
NATO.

Fourth, Turkey neglected to determine precisely

the terms of her numerous agreements with the United States

and NATO.

Fifth, she did not calculate the costs involved

in exclusive reliance on the United States and the

the rest of her relationships with other countries.

V.'est

for

Sixth,

Turkey failed to analyze international politics from a larger
less self -oriented point of view, and therefore, to detect
the changes and emerging new patterns.

And finally, she

failed to appreciate the grievances and problems of those
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states with v/hich she was not allies.
On the basis of this perf orinance

,

the Cyprus affair,

in so far as it led to the Johnson letter, and the
1965

General Assembly vote, must be regarded more as a blessing
than a defeat.
tion she

v/as

It was the disappointment and the frustra-

confronted with that prompted Turkey to cast

off somnolence

,

and affect the changes and modifications

that her foreign policy badly needed.
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